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Rule of law, like any other important political concept such as justice
or equality, is an "essentially contested concept."' Yet the fact that there
is room for debate about the proper interpretation of rule of law should
not blind us to the broad consensus as to its core meaning and basic ele-
ments. At its most basic, rule of law refers to a system in which law is
able to impose meaningful restraints on the State and individual mem-
bers of the ruling elite, as captured in the rhetorically powerful if overly
simplistic notions of a government of laws, the supremacy of the law,
and equality of all before the law.
Theories of rule of law can be divided into two general types: thin
and thick. A thin theory stresses the formal or instrumental aspects of
rule of law-those features that any legal system allegedly must possess
to function effectively as a system of laws, regardless of whether the le-
gal system is part of a democratic or non-democratic society, capitalist or
socialist, liberal or theocratic.2 Although proponents of thin interpreta-
tions of rule of law define it in slightly different ways, there is
considerable common ground, with many building on or modifying Lon
Fuller's influential account that laws be general, public, prospective,
clear, consistent, capable of being followed, stable, and enforced.3
In contrast to thin versions, thick or substantive conceptions begin
with the basic elements of a thin conception. Thick versions then incor-
porate elements of political morality such as particular economic
arrangements (free market capitalism, central planning, and so on),
forms of government (democratic, single party socialist, and so on) or
conceptions of human rights (liberal, communitarian, collectivist, "Asian
Values," and so on).
Thus, the liberal democratic version of rule of law incorporates free
market capitalism (subject to qualifications that would allow various de-
grees of "legitimate" government regulation of the market), multiparty
democracy in which citizens may choose their representatives at all lev-
els of government, and a liberal interpretation of human rights that gives
priority to civil and political rights over economic, social, cultural, and
collective or group rights.
1. Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 791
(1989).
2. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW
210 (1979); Robert S. Summers, The Ideal Socio-Legal Order, I RATIO JURIS 154 (1988)
[hereinafter Summers, Ideal Socio-Legal Order]; Robert S. Summers, A Formal Theory of
Rule of Law, 6 RATIO JURIS 127 (1993) [hereinafter Summers, Formal Theory]; see also infra
Part I.
3. Although one of the first to spell out the elements of a thin theory of rule of law,
Fuller was uncomfortable with the instrumental aspects of a thin theory and its potential for
abuse by authoritarian or fascist regimes, arguing that truly evil regimes would not comply
with even a thin theory. LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1976).
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Although rule of law has ancient roots and may be traced back to
Aristotle, the modern conception of rule of law is integrally related to the
rise of liberal democracy in the West. Indeed, for many, "the rule of law"
means a liberal democratic version of rule of law.4 In striking contrast to
the many volumes on rule of law in the Western literature, relatively little
work exists to clarify alternative conceptions of rule of law in other parts
of the world.5 There is no reason to assume, however, that at the end of
China's legal reform rainbow lie liberal democracy and a liberal democ-
ratic rule of law.
The tendency to equate rule of law with liberal democratic rule of
law has led some Asian commentators to portray the attempts of Western
governments and international organizations such as the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to promote rule of law in Asian
countries as a form of economic, cultural, political, and legal hegemony.'
Critics claim that liberal democratic rule of law is excessively individual-
ist in its orientation and privileges individual autonomy and rights over
duties and obligations to others, the interests of society, social solidarity,
and harmony.' Significantly, although a handful of legal scholars and
political scientists in China or living in exile abroad have advocated a
liberal democratic rule of law, there is little support for liberal democ-
racy, and hence a liberal democratic rule of law, among China's State
4. See, for example, the influential statement of rule of law in the report of the Commit-
tee on the Legislative and the Rule of Law in Int'l Comm'n of Jurists, Rule of Law in a Free
Society, in A REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF JURISTS 61 (New Delhi 1959).
Given the many possible conceptions of rule of law, I avoid reference to "the rule of law,"
which suggests that there is a single type of rule of law. Alternatively, one could refer to the
concept of "the rule of law," for which there are different possible conceptions. The thin the-
ory of rule of law would define the core concept of rule of law, with the various thick theories
constituting different conceptions. Yet as I argue below, from the perspective of philosophical
pragmatism, how one defines a term depends on one's purposes and the consequences that
attach to defining a term in a particular way. As thick and thin theories serve different pur-
poses, I do not want to privilege thin theories over thick theories by declaring the thin version
to be "the rule of law"
5. For a welcome exception, see the essays in LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA
(Kanishka Jayasuriya ed., 1999).
6. See Carol Rose, The "New" Law and Development Movement in the Post-Cold War
Era: A Viet Nam Case Study, 32 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 93, 93-94 (1998); Barry Hager, The Rule
of Law: Defining It and Defending It in the Asian Context, in THE RULE OF LAW: PERSPEC-
TIVES FROM THE PACIFIC RIM (The Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs ed., 2000), available
at http://www.mcpa.org/rol/perspectives.htm (summarizing complaints of critics).
7. See Takashi Oshimura, In Defense of Asian Colors, in THE RULE OF LAW: PERSPEC-
TIVES FROM THE PACIFIC RIM, supra note 6, at 141 (claiming that the individualist orientation
of [liberal democratic] rule of law is at odds with Confucianism and "the communitarian phi-
losophy in Asia"); see also Joon-Hyung Hong, The Rule of Law and Its Acceptance in Asia, in
THE RULE OF LAW: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE PACIFIC RIM, supra note 6, at 149 (noting the
need to define rule of law in a way that is acceptable to those who believe in "Asian Values");
Rose, supra note 6, at 128.
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leaders, legal scholars, intellectuals, or the general public. On the con-
trary, studies show most people are more concerned about stability and
economic growth than democracy and civil and political liberties!
Although China's leaders have officially endorsed rule of law, they
have not sanctioned the liberal democratic version. In 1996, Jiang Zemin
adopted the new tifa, or official policy formulation of ruling the country
in accordance with law and establishing a socialist rule of law State (yifa
zhiguo, jianshe shuhui zhuyifazhiguo), which was subsequently incorpo-
rated into the Constitution in 1999. Since 1996, People's Republic of
China (PRC) scholars have debated the new policy and the concept of
rule of law more generally.9 Some have questioned whether rule of law,
and especially a liberal democratic version of rule of law, will take root
8. See, e.g., Yali Peng, Democracy and Chinese Political Discourses, 24 MOD. CHINA
408, 408-40 (1998); see also Minxin Pei, Racing Against 7ime: Institutional Decay and Re-
newal in China, in CHINA BRIEFING: THE CONTRADICTIONS OF CHANGE 11 (William A.
Joseph ed., 1997). Pei cites polls showing that two-thirds of the people thought that the eco-
nomic situation was improving, while half thought their own living standards were improving.
In the same poll, a majority of respondents (54%) placed a higher priority on economic devel-
opment than democracy. Over two-thirds of those polled supported the government's policy of
promoting economic growth and social stability, and 63% agreed that "it would be a disaster
for China to experience a similar change as that in the former Soviet Union." Id. at 18. Even
40% of non-CCP member respondents said they voluntarily supported the same political posi-
tion as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Id.; see also XIA LI LOLLAR, CHINA'S
TRANSITION TOWARD A MARKET ECONOMY, CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY 74 (1997) (cit-
ing results of poll in which 60% of respondents assigned highest priority to maintaining order,
while another 30% chose controlling inflation; only 8% chose giving people more say in po-
litical decisions and free elections, and a mere 2% chose protecting free speech). Wan Ming
cites survey data showing growing support for the Party, and concludes that a development
consensus that emphasizes stability has emerged. Wan Ming, Chinese Opinion on Human
Rights, 42 ORalS 361 (1998). Another study showed the Chinese to be the least tolerant of
diverse viewpoints among all of the countries surveyed. It also found little support for a free
press and the publishing of alternative views. Andrew Nathan & Shi Tianjian, Cultural Requi-
sites for Democracy in China: Findings from a Survey, 122 DAEDALUS 95 (1993).
Granted, polling results must be used with caution. Often, the design of the question in-
fluences the outcome, as may be the case when people are simply asked to choose between
economic growth and democracy. Moreover, respondents may feel inhibited, and provide what
they feel are safe answers or the answers desired by the pollsters. On the other hand, many of
the surveys provide for anonymity. Further, PRC nationals living abroad often make similar
arguments about democracy and economic growth and exhibit similar values. Nor are such
views limited to mainland PRC citizens. When asked to choose between democracy and eco-
nomic prosperity and political stability, 71% of Hong Kong residents chose the latter, and only
20% chose democracy. Similarly, almost 90% preferred a stable and peaceful handover to
insisting on increasing the pace of democracy. DANIEL BELL, EAST MEETS WEST: HUMAN
RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN EAST ASIA 119 (2000).
9. It is not my purpose here to discuss all of the various arguments or points of conten-
tion. For a general overview, see Albert H.Y Chen, Toward a Legal Enlightenment: Discussion
in Contemporary China on the Rule of Law, 17 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 125 (1999). For a
discussion of debates through the early to mid-1990s, see RONALD C. KEITH, CHINA'S
STRUGGLE FOR THE RULE OF LAW (1994); CHIH-YU SHIH, COLLECTIVE DEMOCRACY: POLITI-
CAL AND LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA (1999).
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in China's very different soil.' ° What is needed, they suggest, is an in-
digenous theory of rule of law-rule of law with Chinese
characteristics-one that takes into consideration China's native re-
sources and China's particular circumstances, its culture, traditions, and
history, as well as other such contingent factors as ideology, the current
stage of development of its legal and political institutions, and the fact
that China is still in the midst of a dramatic transition from a centrally
planned economy to a more market-oriented one. Others argue that an
explicitly socialist theory of rule of law is necessary."
Accordingly, if we are to understand the likely path of development
of China's system, and the reason for differences in its institutions, rules,
practices, and outcomes in particular cases, we need to rethink rule of
law. We need to theorize rule of law in ways that do not assume a liberal
democratic framework, and explore alternative conceptions of rule of
law that are consistent with China's own circumstances. To that end, I
describe four competing thick conceptions of rule of law: Statist Social-
ism, Neo-Authoritarian, Communitarian, and Liberal Democratic.
In contrast to Liberal Democratic rule of law, Jiang Zemin and other
Statist Socialists endorse a State-centered socialist rule of law defined
by, inter alia, a socialist form of economy (which in today's China means
an increasingly market-based economy but one in which public owner-
ship still plays a somewhat larger role than in other market economies); a
non-democratic system in which the (Chinese Communist) Party plays a
leading role; and an interpretation of rights that emphasizes stability,
10. Su Li, Bianfa, Fazhi Jianshe Ji Qi Bentu Ziyuan [Change of Law, Establishment of
the Rule of Law and its Native Resources], 41 ZHONGWAi FAXUE 1, 4 (1995) (emphasizing
China's native resources-bentu ziyuan); Sun Guohua, Cong Zhongguo de Shiji Chufa, Zou
Ziji de Daolu [Start from China's Actual Circumstances, Take Our Own Road], in Zhongguo
Fazhi Shixian Fanglue (Bitanhui) [Strategy for the Realization of the Rule of Law (Written
Exchange of Ideas)], 71 FALO KEXUE 3 (Liu Zuoxiang ed., 1996) [hereinafter Strategy for the
Realization of the Rule of Law] (emphasizing the need to consider China's "national charac-
ter"-guoqing). Ma Xiaohong suggests that rule of law in China must take into account the
traditional emphasis on morality and substantive justice. Ma Xiaohong, Yifa Zhiguo Jianshe
Shehuizhuyi Fazhi Guojia Xueshu Yantaohui Jiyao [Excerpts from the Academic Conference
on Ruling the Country According to Law, Establish a Socialist Rule of Law State], 3 FAXUE
YANJI 3, 17 (1996) [hereinafter Establish a Socialist Rule of Law State]; see also Su Li,
Ershi Shiji Zhongguo de Xiandaihua He Fazhi [Twentieth Century China's Modernization and
Rule of Law], I FAXUE YANJIu 3, 10-12 (1998) (noting that China is still predominantly an
agrarian society). In the villages, custom and traditional informal means of resolving disputes
remain strong. However, as Su Li acknowledges, society is changing and reliance on custom
and traditional informal means of resolving disputes is no longer sufficient. But see Zhang
Wenxian, Lun Lifazhong de Falu Ytzhi [On the Legal Transplant of Legislation], I FAXUE 6
(1996) (arguing that China has little choice but to import laws given the needs and rapid pace
of economic reforms).
11. Shao Cheng, Jiaqiang Lianzheng Fazhi de Jianshe [Strengthen the Establishment of
Good Governance Rule of Law], in Strategy for the Realization of Rule of Law, supra note 10,
at 9.
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collective rights over individual rights, and subsistence as the basic right
rather than civil and political rights.
There is also support for various forms of rule of law that fall be-
tween the Statist Socialism type championed by Jiang Zemin and other
central leaders and the Liberal Democratic version. For example, there is
some support for a democratic but non-liberal (New Confucian)
Communitarian variant built on market capitalism. This form favors a
somewhat greater degree of government intervention than in the liberal
version; some genuine form of multiparty democracy in which citizens
choose their representatives at all levels of government; plus a communi-
tarian or collectivist interpretation of rights that attaches relatively
greater weight to the interests of the majority and collective rights as
opposed to the civil and political rights of individuals.
Another variant is a Neo-Authoritarian or Soft Authoritarian form of
rule of law that, like the Communitarian version, rejects a liberal inter-
pretation of rights, but unlike its Communitarian cousin, also rejects
democracy. Whereas Communitarians adopt a genuine multiparty de-
mocracy in which citizens choose their representatives at all levels of
government, Neo-Authoritarians permit democracy only at lower levels
of government or not at all.'
2
The Article proceeds in three stages. Part I provides a brief overview
of thin versions of rule of law and their relation to thick theories. Part 1H
then takes up the four thick versions of rule of law. Part III addresses a
number of thorny theoretical issues that apply to rule of law theories
generally and more specifically to the applicability of rule of law to
China. For instance, can the minimal conditions for rule of law be suffi-
ciently specified to be useful? Should China's legal system at this point
be described as rule by law, as in transition to rule of law, or as an imper-
fect rule of law? How do we know that the goal of legal reforms in China
is rule of law as opposed to a more efficient rule by law or some third
alternative? Given the many different interpretations of rule of law,
should we just stop referring to rule of law altogether, or at least reserve
rule of law for Liberal Democratic rule of law States? Finally, turning
from theory to practice, are non-Liberal Democratic rule of law systems
sustainable?
12. Alternatively, the Neo-Authoritarian State might give the appearance of allowing
genuine multiparty elections at all levels, but in fact control the outcome by limiting the ability
of opposition parties to campaign (as in Singapore).
[Vol. 23:471
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I. THIN VERSIONS OF RULE OF LAW
Notwithstanding competing thick conceptions of rule of law, there is
general agreement in China and elsewhere that rule of law requires at
minimum that the law impose meaningful limits on State actors. 3 There
is also general agreement that a rule of law system must meet the stan-
dards of a thin conception," though there are some differences in the
13. See, e.g., Wang Jiafu, Guanyu Yifa Zhiguo Jianshe Shehui Zhuyi Fazhi Guojia de
Lilun he Shijian Wenti [On Governing the Country in Accordance with Law: Theoretical and
Practical Issues in Establishing a Socialist Rule of Law State], in ZHONGGONG ZHONGYANG
FAZHI JIANGZUO HUIBIAN 127 (Ministry of Justice ed., 1998) (discussing supremacy of law);
Establish a Socialist Rule of Law State, supra note 10, at 9 (summarizing views of Gao Hong-
jun that rule of law requires, inter alia, supremacy and autonomy of law). Liu Hainian argues
that rule of law requires, inter alia, the supremacy of law, equality before the law and admini-
stration in accordance with law. Liu Hainian, Beilun Shehuizhuyi Fazhi Yuanze [General
Discussion of Socialist Rule of Law Principles], I ZHONGGUo FAXUE 5 (1998). Li Buyun
claims that rule of law requires that (i) laws must be based on the Constitution; (ii) everyone
must act in accordance with the law; (iii) the Constitution and law are made in accordance
with democratic procedures; (iv) all are equal before the law; and (v) there be judicial inde-
pendence. Li Buyun, Xianzheng yu Zhongguo [Constitutionalism and China], in ZOUXIANG
FAZHI [TOWARD THE RULE OF LAW] 10-1 1 (Li Buyun ed., 1998).
14. Despite such general agreement, there are pockets of controversy. For instance, the
emphasis on law's role in limiting the State is based on the liberal Lockean tradition that em-
phasizes the supremacy of the law and the equality of all before the law (though even Locke
allows that government authorities have considerable discretion, and thus may act outside the
law, even against it, provided they do so for the public good). In contrast, Hobbes and Austin
favored the view that whatever the sovereign says is the law, is the law. Thus for Hobbes, the
sovereign authority had to be above the law. See Leslie Friedman Goldstein, The Rule of Law:
Do We Know It When We See It? (2001) (unpublished manuscript presented at Law and Soci-
ety Conference, Budapest, on file with author). Similarly, the emperor in the Imperial Chinese
legal system had the power to make law; and, at least in the view of some commentators, the
(Chinese Communist) Party's leading role means that it must to some extent be above the law
as it plays an important role in determining what the laws will be.
In all systems, the entities with power to make or change laws are in some sense beyond
the law. However, there may still be laws that limit their authority to make or change laws. The
view that the sovereign is above the law and determines the law was modified slightly, but
significantly, by positivists such as H.L.A. Hart, for whom the touchstone for what constitutes
a valid law is whether the rule was promulgated in accordance with proper procedures. Such
procedures, and thus the authority for law, can be traced back to a basic legal norm or a "rule
of recognition." A dictatorial regime, therefore, could exercise legal authority and make law, as
long as it complied with the procedural requirements for making law. Moreover, the rulers
could be required to follow laws once made. Such a system is compatible with rule of law. On
the other hand, a system in which the ruling regime's pronouncements simply have the force
of law and the regime is not itself bound by such laws is better characterized as a rule by law
or Rechtsstaat. For the concept of rule of recognition, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 100 (2d ed. 1994).
In any event, whether or not a legal system based on the rule of recognition that "whatever
the sovereign (or the CCP) says is the law, is the law" is consistent in theory with a thin rule of
law, in practice any such system is likely to fall short of the other requirements of a thin the-
ory. In most cases, the concentration of power in the hands of a single person or party would
result in arbitrary and conflicting laws, rapid change in laws, and difficulty implementing such
laws, and thus a large gap between law and practice.
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way scholars define a thin theory. 5 For present purposes, the constitutive
elements of a thin conception include, in addition to meaningful re-
straints on State actors, the following:
There must be procedural rules for lawmaking and laws must be
made by an entity with the authority to make laws in accordance
with such rules to be valid;
Transparency: laws must be made public and readily accessible;
Laws must be generally applicable: that is, laws must not be
aimed at a particular person and must treat similarly situated
people equally.
Laws must be relatively clear;
Laws generally must be prospective rather than retroactive;
Laws must be consistent on the whole;
Laws must be relatively stable;
Laws must be fairly applied;
A second objection to the Lockean emphasis on limiting State actors is that it reflects the
concerns and biases of the liberal tradition, invoking images of atomistic individuals opposed
to the State. In contrast, Chinese political traditions have emphasized a more harmonious
relation between the State and the people, with persons viewed as socially-situated selves
defined in terms of their social roles and relationships to others. Whatever the merits of these
generalizations, Chinese citizens today appreciate the importance of limiting arbitrary State
action. With the pluralization of interests that has resulted from economic reforms, harmony
among the divergent social groups and between such groups and the State is even less likely
than in the past. Thus, the differences between China and other countries are likely to be more
a matter of degree than of kind. As noted below, Statist Socialists, Neo-Authoritarians, Com-
munitarians, and Liberal Democrats all accept that law must bind the State, though they differ
on the degree. A related concern, discussed below, is that it is not clear how meaningful the
limits on State actors must be for the system to be considered "rule of law."
15. A quick comparison of the lists of rule of law elements of John Finnis, Lon Fuller,
Joseph Raz, Geoffrey Q. Walker, Richard Fallon, Robert Summers, and various PRC scholars
reveals both common ground and some differences. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND
NATURAL RIGHTS 270-71 (1980); FULLER, supra note 3, at 39; RAZ, supra note 2; GEOFFREY
DE Q. WALKER, THE RULE OF LAW 23-42 (1988); Richard Fallon, The Rule of Law as a Con-
cept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1997); Summers, Formal Theory,
supra note 2.
Preferring thick to thin theories, several PRC scholars begin with a list similar to Fuller's
and then add various elements, some of them substantive. See Xu Xianming, Lun "Fazhi" de
Goucheng Yaojian [On the Constitutive Elements of Rule of Law], 3 FAXUE YANJiU 3, 37
(1996); Liu Junning, Cong Fazhiguo Dao Fazhi [From Rechtsstaat to Rule of Law], in
ZHENGZHi ZHONGGUO [POLITICAL CHINA] 233, 254-56 (Dong Yuyu & Shi Binhai eds., 1998)
[hereinafter POLITICAL CHINA]. Xia Yong, Fazhi shi shenme [What is the rule of law?], 4
ZHONGGUO SHEHU KEXUE 117 (1999), for example, adds supremacy of the law, judicial au-
thority, and judicial justice to the list.
[Vol. 23:471
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Laws must be enforced: the gap between the law on the books
and law in practice should be narrow; and
Laws must be reasonably acceptable to a majority of the popu-
lace or people affected (or at least the key groups affected) by
the laws.
6
That laws be reasonably acceptable to the majority of those affected
by them does not mean that the laws are necessarily "good laws" in the
sense of normatively justified. The majority might support immoral laws.
Historically, immoral laws are often buttressed by prevailing social prac-
tices and widely held norms and values. Furthermore, many laws serve
an amoral purpose. For example, whether cars drive on the right or left is
not a moral issue. Laws that solve such collective action problems, facili-
tate commercial transactions, or otherwise make it easier for people to
get on with their lives will be acceptable to most people simply because
they work.
7
A thin theory requires more than just these elements. A fully articu-
lated thin theory also specifies the goals and purposes of the system as
well as its institutions, rules, practices, and outcomes. Typical candidates
for the more limited normative purposes served by thin versions of rule
of law include: 8
16. The requirement that laws must be reasonably acceptable to the majority of those af-
fected by the law (and hence followed) is on this view an element of rule of law, not of law
per se. Thin theories generally take as their starting point a positivist account of law. Follow-
ing Hart, we can draw a distinction between the validity and efficacy of a rule or law. A law is
valid when it is passed in accordance with the system's rule of recognition even if it is not
obeyed in practice and not enforced. However, a law is more efficacious the more it is obeyed.
The existence of too many valid, but routinely ignored laws, undermines the legal system and
rule of law, running afoul of the requirement that the gap between law on the books and law in
practice be reasonably narrow. See generally HART, supra note 14.
For Hart, citizens need not like the laws or find them normatively justified. As long as
people obey the laws, the legal system could exist and function. See id. However, as a practical
matter, relying on compulsory enforcement for every law is costly and impractical. For this
reason, Geoffrey Walker includes general congruence of law with social values as one of the
requirements of a thin theory of rule of law, although he notes: "In a sense we may be cheating
a little by making this ... point an element or part of the definition. Strictly speaking, it is a
limit on the model, not an ingredient of it. The rule of law could theoretically exist without
this requirement being satisfied. But ... it would not last long." WALKER, supra note 15, at 28;
see also RAZ, supra note 2 (arguing that the notion that people should be ruled by law and
obey it suggests that the acceptability of the law and respect for law would be advantageous, if
not absolutely necessary).
17. Long before Hart, Max Weber noted the relation between rule of law and legitimacy.
He maintained that citizens were more likely to find clear, predictable laws that are fairly
applied by an autonomous judiciary legitimate, and that they would be more likely to
comply-without the need for coercion-with laws they found legitimate. See MAX WEBER,
MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Max Rheinstein ed., 1954).
18. For a discussion, see Randall Peerenboom, Ruling the Country in Accordance with
Law: Reflections on the Rule and Role of Law in China, II CULTURAL DYNAMICS 315 (1999).
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stability, and preventing anarchy and Hobbesian war of all
against all;
securing government in accordance with law-rule of law as op-
posed to rule of man-by limiting arbitrariness on the part of the
government;
enhancing predictability, which allows people to plan their af-
fairs and hence promotes both individual freedom and economic
development;
providing a fair mechanism for the resolution of disputes; and
bolstering the legitimacy of the government.
A variety of institutions and processes are also required. The prom-
ulgation of law assumes a legislature and the government machinery
necessary to make the laws publicly available. It also presupposes rules
for making laws. Congruence of laws on the books and actual practice
supposes institutions for implementing and enforcing laws. While infor-
mal means of enforcing laws may be possible in some contexts, modern
societies must also rely on formal means such as courts and administra-
tive bodies. If the law is to guide behavior and provide certainty and
predictability, laws must be applied and enforced in a reasonable way
that does not completely defeat people's expectations. This implies nor-
mative and practical limits on the decisionmakers who interpret and
apply the laws and principles of due process or natural justice, such as
access to impartial tribunals, a chance to present evidence, and rules of
evidence.
A. Advantages of Thin Theories
Depending on one's purpose, thin theories may offer several advan-
tages over thick conceptions. One potential advantage is that thick
conceptions require a complete moral and political philosophy. As
Joseph Raz observes:
If rule of law is the rule of the good law then to explain its na-
ture is to propound a complete social philosophy. But if so the
term lacks any useful function. We have no need to be converted
to rule of law just in order to believe that good should tri-
umph.... A non-democratic legal system, based on the denial of
human rights, of extensive poverty, on racial segregation, sexual
inequalities, and religious persecution may, in principle, con-
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form to the requirements of rule of law better than any of the
legal systems of the more enlightened Western democracies."
Even the more limited thin version of rule of law has many impor-
tant virtues. 20 At minimum, it promises some degree of predictability and
at least some limitation on arbitrariness and hence some protection of
individual rights and freedoms. By narrowing the focus, a thin theory
highlights the importance of the virtues of rule of law.
A thin interpretation also allows for focused and productive discus-
sion of rule of law among persons of different political persuasions. As
Robert Summers notes: "A substantive theory necessarily ranges over
highly diverse subject matter, and thus sprawls in its application. On a
full-fledged substantive theory, arguments and criticisms purportedly in
the name of 'rule of law' tend to be arguments and criticisms in the name
of too many different things at once."2' Being able to narrow the focus of
discussion and avoid getting bogged down in larger issues of political
morality is particularly important in cross-cultural dialogue between, for
example, American liberals and Chinese socialists or Muslim fundamen-
talists.
As a practical matter, much of the moral force behind rule of law
and its enduring importance as a political ideal today is predicated on the
ability to use rule of law as a benchmark to condemn or praise particular
rules, decisions, practices, and legal systems.22 To the extent that there is
common ground and agreement on at least some features of a thin rule of
law, many of the theoretical and practical problems associated with nor-
mative valuations in a pluralist society and world are avoided. Criticisms
are more likely to be taken seriously and result in actual change given a
shared understanding of rule of law. Conversely, criticisms of China's
legal system that point out the many ways in which the system falls short
of a liberal interpretation of rule of law are likely to fall on deaf ears and
may indeed produce a backlash that undermines support for rule of law,
thereby ironically impeding reforms favored by liberals.23
19. RAZ, supra note 2, at 211.
20. See Summers, Ideal Socio-Legal Order, supra note 2, at 161; Summers, Formal The-
ory, supra note 2, at 135-38.
2 1. Summers, Formal Theory, supra note 2, at 137.
22. See Fallon, supra note 15, at 43.
23. When the United States and China agreed on a project aimed at improving China's
legal system during the 1997 Jiang-Clinton summit, the Chinese side rejected the label "rule
of law" in favor of "legal cooperation." Presumably, PRC representatives rejected "rule of
law" because of the vagueness of the concept and the potentially broad implications for politi-
cal reform. Paul Gewirtz, Address at Law in Contemporary China Conference, Harvard
University (Mar. 1999). However, China and Germany have been cooperating in the field for a
number of years, and promoting rule of law in China normally is an explicit goal of the indi-
vidual cooperation projects agreed upon between the two. Furthermore, since June 2000,
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Some PRC scholars suggest an additional reason for emphasizing a
thin or procedural rule of law over a thick or substantive rule of law for
China at this time. China has historically favored substantive justice
over procedural justice25 and, in the clash between morals and law, mor-
als have often won out. The tendency has been to favor particular justice
at the expense of generality and rationality. 6 While strong normative ar-
guments may be made in favor of a particularized substantive justice, in
practice this emphasis gives decisionmakers considerable discretion and
makes the process more subjective. To correct for the tendency toward
substantive justice, the legal system should arguably stress the more rule-
oriented procedural aspects of a thin rule of law.
B. Normative Concerns About Thin Theories and the
Relation Between Thin and Thick Theories
PRC scholars object to thin theories primarily on normative grounds.
First, many fear that an authoritarian government may use a thin rule of
China and Germany have undertaken a broader dialogue on legal issues explicitly dealing with
rule of law, initiated by the Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji and the German Chancellor
Gerhardt Schroder. A description of the project is available at http://www.bmj.bund.de (last
visited Apr. 1, 2002). The German term used is Rechtsstaatlickeit. In a strictly positivistic
sense both Rechtsstaat and Rechtsstaatlickeit can be used to describe a "rule of law" system
which merely satisfies the requirement of a thin rule of law, but which features laws that are
unjust in that they are not in accordance with any generally accepted notion of justice. How-
ever, today both Rechtstaat as well as Rechtsstaatlickeit are understood by the German
constitutional court to refer to a more substantive or thick rule of law, with the definition being
derived from the content of the German Constitution. Personal communication with a German
lawyer working on the projects in Beijing, who noted that trying to implement a Liberal De-
mocratic thick rule of law concept in China would be counterproductive, as his own
experience working on these projects clearly showed (e-mail on file with author).
24. See, e.g., Sun Xiaoxia, Zhongguo Fazhi De Xianshi Mubiao Xuanze [Choosing the
Target for the Realization of the Rule of Law in China], in Strategy for the Realization of the
Rule of Law, supra note 10, at 12. Shen Guoming has also argued that traditionally there was
too much emphasis on quan-context.specific reasoning-rather than jing-regularity and
generality-and that China should now emphasize the formal aspects of rule of law over the
substantive. Shen Guoming, Establish a Socialist Rule of Law State, supra note 10, at 10.
25. Although there were procedural requirements, they were more oriented toward ensur-
ing that officials properly performed their duties than protecting individual rights or interests.
See, e.g., WILLIAM JONES, THE GREAT QING CODE (1994); William Alford, Of Arsenic and
Old Laws: Looking Anew at Criminal Justice in Imperial China, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1180 (1984).
As Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris note, imperial law was only secondarily interested in
defending interests of one individual or group against another and not at all interested in de-
fending individual or group interests against the State. DERK BODDE & CLARENCE MORRIS,
LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 4 (1967).
26. See, e.g., Benjamin Schwartz, On Attitudes Toward Law in China, in GOVERNMENT
UNDER LAW AND THE INDIVIDUAL (Milton Katz ed., 1957). As Alice Tay observes: "Whereas
Western legal procedure tends to depersonalize all claims in order to bring out more sharply
the question at issue, Chinese tradition personalizes all claims, seeing them in the context of
human relations" Alice Erh-Soon Tay, The Struggle for Law in China, 21 U. BRIT. COLUM. L.
REV. 561, 562 (1987).
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law to strengthen the regime while diminishing individual rights. In the
absence of democracy and opportunities for public participation in the
law-making processes, the ruling regime can pass illiberal laws that limit
individual rights, such as broad State secrets laws, rules against endan-
gering the State, or regulations requiring that all social groups register
with government authorities.27 By grounding rights in a thick conception
of rule of law, some scholars hope to offset the socialist tendency to view
law in instrumental terms and to consider rights as positivist grants from
the State that may be revoked and limited by the State as it sees fit.
28
Second, and related, many people simply find thin theories lacking
in sufficient substantive normative content. 9 Given the traditional em-
phasis on substantive justice, the virtues of a largely procedural thin
theory appear insubstantial. For many both in China and abroad, a rule
of law that is compatible with morally reprehensible evil empires like
Nazi Germany is simply not worth pursuing.3 °
27. Of course, even democracies that allow public participation may pass illiberal laws.
28. On the conception of rights in positivist rather than natural law terms and something
that is granted by the State and may be revoked by the State, see R. Randle Edwards, Civil and
Social Rights: Theory and Practice in Chinese Law Today, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPO-
RARY CHINA 41, 44-45 (R. Randle Edwards et al. eds., 1986); see also Li Buyun & Zhang
Zhiming, Kuashiji de Mubiao: Yifa Zhiguo, Jianshe Shehuizhuyi Fazhi Guojia [The Cross-
Century Target: Ruling the Country According to Law, Establishing a Socialist Rule of Law
State], 6 ZHONGGUO FAXUE 18, 25 (1997).
29. See, e.g., Li, supra note 13; Liu, supra note 15; Xia, supra note 15.
30. Four further points are worth noting. First, in the rare case of a rule-of-law-compliant
authoritarian government misusing law for normatively reprehensible ends, there surely are
more direct and telling criticisms of the regime than that it is violating rule of law. A dictator
who commits racial or ethnic genocide, or a corrupt authoritarian leader that misuses the legal
system to advance the economic interests of his family and cronies while turning a blind eye
to widespread, abject poverty and human suffering, surely deserves to be subject to moral
censure. Still, to claim that they are violating rule of law somehow misses the point. To focus
on rule of law violations in the case of Hitler, Pol Pot, or South Africa highlights the wrong
normative issues. Expanding the concept of rule of law makes such criticisms possible, but at
the price of obscuring the primary virtues of rule of law, thus increasing the likelihood that
discussions of rule of law will get bogged down in disagreements over such insolvable issues
as positive versus natural law, the nature of justice, the merits of socialism versus liberal de-
mocracy, and so on. Second, whether as an empirical matter Nazi Germany or apartheid South
Africa met the standards of a thin rule of law is much debated. Third, today countries and their
legal systems are embedded in an international legal order. Accordingly, any country whose
legal system meets the requirements of a thin rule of law must comply with its international
legal obligations, including its obligations with respect to human rights set forth in interna-
tional treaties to which it is a party and derived from international customary law and jus
cogens principles. Although there is considerable debate as to the content of such rights, their
interpretation, and how they are to be implemented, at minimum they provide some normative
constraints on evil empires. Fourth, insisting on more robust normative constraints beyond
what is required by international law leads to a slippery slope problem and the risk of impos-
ing one's own values on others. Liberals may consider some laws that limit individual freedom
in the name of maintaining social order morally repugnant, and thus not "good laws." Com-
munitarians, Neo-Authoritarians, and Statist Socialists may simply disagree.
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To remedy the lack of an adequate normative content to a thin rule of
law, scholars both in the PRC and elsewhere have suggested that rule of
law requires "good laws."3' Harold Berman, for instance, claims that rule
of law requires laws that are grounded in some normative foundation that
transcends the legal system itself. In the past, divine law or natural law
provided the foundation; today, a more secular notion of democracy and
human rights provide the foundation.32 Similar to Berman, Liu Junning
has distinguished rule of law (fazhi) from fazhiguo, which he interprets
as a rule of law State or Rechtsstaat.33 Liu argues that rule of law is based
on a natural law tradition whereas Rechtsstaat is based on legal positiv-
ism. Grounded in- natural law, rule of law takes rights more seriously,
whereas rights in a Rechtsstaal are granted by the State and may be lim-
ited by a simple majority of the legislature. A Rechtsstaat emphasizes
following laws rather than the purpose or values of the law and the need
to protect individual freedom; it puts more importance on the origin of
laws rather than whether the laws are good or not.
In the absence of a deeply rooted natural law tradition, those who do
not support democracy but believe that rule of law entails good laws
must look elsewhere for a normative basis for laws. Pan Wei, for exam-
ple, contends that laws should be derived from "generally-accepted
moral principles of the time," and therefore accepted as just by the pub-
lic.
34
Like Pan, PRC scholars, going beyond the contention that rule of
law requires good laws, assert that it entails justice for all.35 Dong Yuyu,
for instance, argues that ruling the country in accordance with law (yifa
zhiguo) is not the same as rule of law (fazhi), even allowing that the for-
mer entails the supremacy of the law. He believes that rule of law
requires more-specifically, peace, order, freedom, and justice.36
31. Wang, supra note 13, at 117; Liu, supra note 15, at 254-55; Xu, supra note 15. It is
not always clear whether the authors mean "good" in an effective, efficient, prudential sense,
or "good" in a moral sense. The emphasis on the utility of the laws is understandable given the
low quality of much legislation.
32. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 294 (1983); Harold J. Berman, The Rule
of Law and the Law-Based State (Rechtsstaat), in TOWARD THE "RULE OF LAW" IN RUSSIA?:
POLITICAL AND LEGAL REFORM IN THE TRANSITION PERIOD 43-60 (Donald D. Barry ed.,
1992).
33. Liu, supra note 15, at 233.
34. Pan Wei, Democracy or Rule of Law?-China's Political Future (May 19-21, 2001)
(unpublished manuscript presented at the University of Denver Center for China-United
States Cooperation Conference on China's Political Options, Vail, Colorado, on file with au-
thor).
35. See id.; Liu, supra note 15, at 255; Xu, supra note 15.
36. See Dong Yuyu, Tongguo izhi Zhengzhi Gaige de Fazhi zhi Lu [The Rule of Law
Road to Political System Reform], in POLITICAL CHINA, supra note 15, at 57.
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Although justice is a popular requirement for rule of law, there is lit-
tle agreement over what justice is. Liberals, Socialists, Communitarians,
Neo-Authoritarians, Soft Authoritarians, New Conservatives, Old Con-
servatives, Buddhists, Daoists, Neo-Confucians, and New Confucians all
differ on what is considered just, and hence what rule of law requires. By
incorporating particular conceptions of the economy, political order, or
human rights into rule of law, thick conceptions decrease the likelihood
that a consensus will emerge as to its meaning. Indeed, one reason for
limiting the concept of rule of law to the requirements of a thin theory is
to avoid getting mired in never-ending debates about the superiority of
the various political theories all contending for the throne of justice.
While thin and thick versions of rule of law are analytically distinct,
in the real world there are no freestanding thin rule of law legal systems
that exist independently of a particular political, economic, social, and
cultural context. In other words, any legal system that meets the stan-
dards of a thin rule of law is inevitably embedded in a particular
institutional, cultural, and values complex, whether that be Liberal
Democratic, Statist Socialist, Neo-Authoritarian, Communitarian, some
combination of them, or some other alternative.
Concentric circles offer one way to conceive of the relationship be-
tween a thin rule of law, particular thick conceptions of rule of law, and
their broader context. The smallest circle consists of the core elements of
a thin rule of law, which are embedded within a thick rule of law concep-
tion or framework. The thick conception is, in turn, part of a broader
social and political philosophy that addresses a range of issues beyond
those relating to the legal system and rule of law. This broader social and
political philosophy is one aspect of a more comprehensive general phi-
losophy or world view that might include metaphysics, aesthetics, and
religious beliefs.
The use of a thin rule of law as a benchmark to assess China's legal
system does not allow one to completely avoid all substantive issues of
the type that advocates of a thick theory of rule of law must address. It
merely reduces the range of issues where such substantive values are
relevant and, hence, the scope of possible conflict. Although the features
of a thin rule of law are common to all rule of law systems, they will
vary to some extent in interpretation and implementation depending on
one's substantive political views and values. Socialists and liberals, for
example, may agree that one purpose of a thin rule of law is to protect
individual rights and interests, but disagree about what those rights and
interests are. Or, they may agree that rule of law requires creation of
laws by an entity with the authority to make laws, but disagree as to
whether members of that entity must be democratically elected.
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Accordingly, they will still diverge to some extent with respect to
purposes, institutions, rules, and outcomes due to the different contexts
in which they are embedded.
II. FOUR IDEAL TYPES: STATIST SOCIALIST, NEo-AUTHORITARIAN,
COMMUNITARIAN, LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC
Given the wide variety of political beliefs and conceptions of a just
socio-political order, it is theoretically possible to categorize thick con-
ceptions of rule of law in several ways. In order to facilitate discussion,
however, I have divided PRC views into four schools: Statist Socialist,
Neo-Authoritarian, Communitarian, and Liberal Democratic. A few pre-
liminary observations about these conceptions may help avoid
misunderstandings. First, a full elaboration of any of these types requires
a more detailed account of the purposes or goals the regime is intended
to serve and its institutions, practices, rules, and outcomes.37 These four
ideal types were constructed with the present realities of China in mind.
For instance, I attribute to Statist Socialism a belief in a market econ-
omy. Although this does not rule out the possibility of a Statist Socialist
rule of law that adopts a centrally planned economy, China can no longer
be described in such terms. My purpose is not to create an exhaustive set
of categories that can be applied to all countries and legal systems, or
even all Asian countries.38 The categories may not be applicable at all to
other countries, or even if applicable in a general sense, they may need
refining in light of particular circumstances and issues.
Nor are these categories exhaustive with respect to China. A form of
semi-religious rule of law might be appropriate for some parts of China
given the wide regional differences and the importance of religion and
non-Han values in some areas such as Tibet and Xinjiang. 9 Moreover,
the ideal types could be further subdivided. Thus, Communitarian rule of
law could come in a more statist "Asian Values" version, a pragmatic
New Confucian version, or a Deweyean civic republicanism version that
mirrors much of the Liberal Democratic order's value structure and insti-
37. See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW (2002).
38. Jayasuriya's commendable effort to develop an alternative to a liberal conception of
rule of law is, in my view, marred by his strong-arm attempt to force all Asian countries into
his statist model. As several of the other contributors point out, his model fails to capture the
diversity within Asia. The model is even less applicable to two countries conspicuously miss-
ing from the volume-Japan and South Korea. See generally LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN
ASIA, supra note 5.
39. I am indebted for this point to Xia Yong, Director of the China Academy of Social
Sciences (CASS) Law Institute.
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tutional framework.' ° Although one could create an ever-expanding tax-
onomy by making finer specifications of any of the variables or
introducing new ones, at some point, one begins to lose sight of the for-
est for the trees.4' For present purposes, these four types are sufficient to
capture the main differences between dominant prevailing political and
legal views.
Because the four representative variants are ideal types and are
intended to reflect real positions, it is therefore possible to identify
schools of thought and individuals that fall into each category. 2 At the
40. As Michael Davis notes, Communitarianism in Asia is different than in the West in
that Western communitarians assume a liberal democratic framework. Michael Davis, Consti-
tutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate Over Human Rights and Asian Values, 11 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 109 (1998). In contrast, Asian communitarians tend to be more conservative and
authoritarian. Asian neo-conservative communitarians emphasize hierarchy and order rather
than pluralism and vibrant social discourse. Western communitarians put more stress on equal-
ity and liberation of the members of the community. For an attempt to develop a Deweyean-
Confucian alternative to liberalism, see DAVID HALL & ROGER AMES, DEMOCRACY OF THE
DEAD: DEWEY, CONFUCIUS AND THE HOPE FOR DEMOCRACY IN CHINA (1999). William Theo-
dore De Bary argues for a more liberal form of Confucian Communitarianism. WILLIAM
THEODORE DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CONFUCIAN COMMUNITARIAN
PERSPECTIVE (1998). While admirable preliminary attempts to sketch a philosophical theory
of Confucian Communitarianism, neither account addresses in any detail the issue of rule of
law nor provides details regarding political or legal institutions, legal rules, or outcomes with
respect to particular controversial issues. Daniel Bell assesses the arguments for and against a
communitarian system based on non-liberal democratic traditions and values, suggesting that
such a system may suit certain States. See BELL, supra note 8. Critics of Asian Communitari-
anism have pointed out that often citizens in Asian countries exhibit precious little concern for
the community. Indeed, in China today the principal units of normative concern and allegiance
appear to be the family and the State, with little regard shown for what falls between these two
units. Accordingly, "collectivism" might be a better descriptive term than Communitarianism.
On normative grounds, however, Communitarianism provides a better foundation for estab-
lishing a normatively attractive social and political order than collectivism.
41. If China's legal system does, at some point, reach a stable equilibrium state, for ex-
ample coming to rest in some form of Communitarian rule of law, it would become necessary
to draw increasingly fine distinctions between the various forms of Communitarian rule of
law. By way of comparison, the category of Liberal Democratic rule of law, while useful for
comparative purposes with respect to competing conceptions of rule of law in China, is of
little use without further specification for capturing competing conceptions of rule of law in
Western liberal democracies. With respect to the United States for instance, one would need to
distinguish between libertarians, conservatives, communitarians, and liberals, and then be-
tween various schools of liberals-including traditional liberals, social liberals, postmodern
liberals, and so on. Moreover, particular issues might be more important in one context than
another. For example, in the United States, the fault lines for competing conceptions of rule of
law tend to run along the lines of different theories of constitutional interpretation. See Fallon,
supra note 15.
42. Jiang Zemin's report at the 15th Party Congress is an excellent example of Statist
Socialism. Jiang Zemin's Congress Report, FBIS-CHI-97-266 (September 23, 1997). Neo-
Authoritarianism is generally associated with Zhao Ziyang and members of his think tank.
See, e.g., Barry Sautman, Sirens of the Strongman: Neo-Authoritarianism in Recent Chinese
Political Theory, 129 CHINA Q. 72 (1992). However, I use the term in a more inclusive way.
For instance, Neo-Authoritarianism has resurfaced in the form of New Conservatism and
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same time, they are a distillation of the views of many different
individuals, drawn not only from written sources but also from
thousands of conversations with scholars, legal academics, judges,
lawyers, and citizens over the years. 3 Consequently, no one type may fit
exactly the position of any one person or group. For instance, while most
New Conservatives would support Neo-Authoritarianism, some might
favor Statist Socialism or Communitarianism." Others might not fit
elitist democracy. See Edward Gu, Elitist Democracy and China's Democratization, 4
DEMOCRATIZATION 2 (1997) (noting that, despite some differences, New Conservatives and
elitist democrats share the same basic views with respect to democracy and the role of the elite
in bringing about social order and harmony). Pan Wei, a political scientist at Beijing
University, has put forth a "consultative rule of law" that incorporates and builds on the basic
principles of Neo-Authoritarianism, including the rejection of democracy in favor of a strong
State, albeit with a much reduced role for the Party. See Pan, supra note 34. Liberal
Democratic rule of law is well represented by Liu Junning and many living abroad in exile,
such as Baogang He. See Liu, supra note 15, at 233; BAOGANG HE, THE DEMOCRATIZATION
OF CHINA (1996). No PRC scholar has articulated a comprehensive theory of a
Communitarian rule of law, though some have criticized aspects of the current system, taken
exception to various features of a Liberal Democratic order, and developed pieces of a
communitarian alternative. Xia Yong has attempted to construct a virtue-based theory of
rights. Similarly, scholars in China and abroad have defended communitarian positions against
liberal democratic critics, but generally on highly abstract philosophical grounds and primarily
with respect to alternatives to democracy and liberal human rights. Supra text accompanying
note 41. The Communitarian position captures the views of the majority of Chinese citizens
who may wish for democracy, but not right now, as reflected in the polling data cited supra
note 8. They value individual rights, but fear even more disorder and chaos. Accordingly,
Chinese citizens draw a different balance than liberals between individual rights and group
interests. This position is evident in the legal and philosophical literature of the long running
debates over collectivism and the relation between rights and duties. See, e.g., Shih, supra note
9. The four positions also track the result of Peng's survey of political discourse in China.
Peng's four categories overlap to a large extent with the four positions I have identified, with
radical democracy representing the Liberal Democratic view; established conservativism
representing Statist Socialism; concerned traditionalism representing Neo-Authoritarianism;
and alienated populism aligning to some degree with Communitarianism, albeit a jaded and
somewhat cynical communitarian view. One of the striking features is that, despite radically
divergent views on democracy, all four groups strongly support rule of law. See Peng, supra
note 8, at 428-31.
43. In some cases, I have drawn on current institutions, rules, practices, and outcomes to
demonstrate features of the various positions, particularly Statist Socialism and Neo-
Authoritarianism, but also to some extent Communitarianism and rule by law. While the cur-
rent system does not exhibit many features of a Liberal Democratic order, it is possible to
appeal to Western countries for concrete, "real life" examples. The Communitarian variant is
the most hypothetical (in the sense of not being grounded in existing institutions and prac-
tices) of the positions as the current system remains more State-dominated than the
Communitarian view would allow. One advantage of defining a Communitarian rule of law in
a rigorous way is that it becomes possible to design a survey instrument to gauge the degree of
support for it among the populace.
44. XiaoGongqin, one of the leading New Conservative theorists, considers himself a
Neo-Authoritarian. However, his support for the Party also aligns him with Statist Socialists.
On New Conservatives, see Merle Goldman, The Potential for Instability Among Alienated
Intellectuals and Students in Post-Mao China, in Is CHINA UNSTABLE? (David Shambaugh
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easily into any category, but rather endorse elements from different
schools. Although certain individuals may express general support for
some central tenets of the various ideal types, they will not have
addressed all of this Article's issues specifically. At times, the positions
attributed to their variant of rule of law are therefore a logical extension
of their ideas based on inferences from their general principles.
Each of the various types is compatible with a variety of institutions,
practices, rules, and to some extent, outcomes. Within Western liberal
democratic legal orders, for example, there is considerable variation
along each of these dimensions. Take such a basic issue as separation of
powers. In the United States, separation of powers refers to a system in
which the legislature, executive, and judiciary are constitutionally inde-
pendent and equal branches. In contrast, the United Kingdom and
Belgium, among others, are parliamentary supreme States. Despite these
structural differences, no country-not even the United States-adheres
to the simplistic separation of powers where the legislature passes laws,
the executive implements them, and the courts interpret and enforce
them by adjudicating disputes. For better or worse, administrative agen-
cies everywhere make, implement, and adjudicate laws. 5
Conversely, different regimes may share similar purposes, institu-
tions, practices, and rules. Given a general consensus on the purposes
and elements of a thin theory, one would expect of course a certain
amount of convergence in institutions, practices, and rules. In order to
enhance predictability and limit governmental arbitrariness, China has
established many of the same mechanisms for controlling administrative
discretion as have other regimes.46 It has also enacted a number of ad-
ministrative laws modeled on comparable laws in the United States and
Europe.
Notwithstanding the wide variation within particular regime types on
the one hand and the overlap among different regime types on the other,
the ideological differences that underlie different thick conceptions of
rule of law tend to be reflected in variations in institutional arrange-
ments, practices, rules, and most importantly in outcomes. Indeed, even
if China imported wholesale U.S. institutions and legal doctrines, the
outcomes in particular cases would still differ because of fundamental
ed., 2000); Barret McCormick & David Kelly, The Limits of Anti-Liberalism, 53 J. ASIAN
STUD. 804 (1994).
45. See, e.g., KENNETH F. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL
SYSTEM 310 (1982) ("[A]dministrative agencies, much to the dismay of those who endorse a
clear separation of powers in government, have legislative, judicial and administrative pow-
ers.").
46. Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of Law: Admin-
istrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People's Republic of China, 19 BERKELEY J.
INT'L. L. 161 (2001).
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differences in values, political beliefs, and philosophies. The four ideal
types, therefore, serve a heuristic purpose in capturing some of the basic
differences between alternative thick conceptions of rule of law in the
PRC.
For comparison purposes, I refer to a rule by law regime where rele-
vant. Rule by law systems come in different varieties as well. The legal
system during the Mao era, particularly during the Cultural Revolution,
exemplified an extreme version that, at times, could hardly be described
as a rule by law legal system, which implies some form of law-based
order.47 Notwithstanding variation within the category of rule by law, rule
by law is distinguishable from rule of law systems in that the former re-
jects the central premise of rule of law: that law is to impose meaningful
limits on even the highest government officials. Nevertheless, a rule by
law system, especially a more moderate form than that of the Mao era,
may share some features with some versions of rule of law, particularly
the Statist Socialist and Neo-Authoritarian ones; for example, the rejec-
tion of elections in favor of single party rule. This is hardly surprising
given that institutions, rules, or practices may serve more than one pur-
pose or end. In some cases, however, certain features may appear to be
the same but differ in degree or the role they play in rule of law and rule
by law regimes. For instance, while Communitarians accept some limits
on civil society, the limits are much more restrictive in a rule by law sys-
tem, even a moderate rule by law regime. Similarly, a rule by law system
aims at a much higher degree of thought control than the others.
A. The Economic Regime
Although all four rule of law variants favor a market economy, they
differ with respect to the degree, nature, and manner of government in-
tervention. Notwithstanding the significant differences in the economies
of Western liberal democracies that have led neo-institutionalists and
political economists to posit varieties of capitalism even within Europe,
48
47. Chinese commentators often describe the Mao era, or at least the Cultural Revolution
period, as rule by man (renzhi). However, even during the Cultural Revolution, the legal sys-
tem continued to exist and limp along. Claims that China fell into a state of legal anarchy and
legal nihilism are overstated. In any event, my concern here is not with the distinction between
rule of man and Mao era rule by law. More relevant for present purposes is the opposite end of
the rule by law spectrum, where rule by law arguably butts up against rule of law.
48. For an assessment of the variety of capitalism literature, see Peter Hall, The Political
Economy of Europe in an Era of Independence, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN CONTEMPO-
RARY CAPITALISM (Herbert Kitschelt et al. eds., 1999); J. Roger Hollingsworth & Robert
Boyer, Coordination of Economic Actors and Social Systems of Production, in CONTEMPO-
RARY CAPITALISM: THE EMBEDDEDNESS OF INSTITUTIONS (J. Rogers Hollingsworth & Robert
Boyer eds., 1997). On the importance of institutions to economic development, see generally
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economies in liberal democratic States tend to be characterized by
minimal government regulation intended primarily to correct market
failures, a clear distinction between the public sphere and private com-
mercial sphere, and limited administrative discretion to interfere in
private business.
In contrast, economic growth in many Asian countries, including
China, has been attributed to a form of managed capitalism in which the
State actively intervenes in the market, government officials blur the line
between public and private spheres by establishing clientelist or corpora-
tist relationships with private businesses, and universal laws are
complemented-and sometimes supplanted-by administrative guid-
ance, vertical and horizontal relationships, and informal mechanisms for
resolving disputes. 9 In these Asian development States, the government
relies on its licensing power and control over access to loans, technology,
and other information and inputs to steer companies in the direction de-
termined by the State. In some cases, the government champions
particular companies or sectors of the economy and may also have a di-
rect or indirect economic interest in certain companies. Of course there
is considerable variation in the amount, nature, and form of government
intervention in Asian countries. Hong Kong's economy has been as lais-
sez-faire as any in the West. On the whole, however, Asian governments
have taken a more interventionist approach to managing the economy.
China's economy is now heavily regulated and characterized by cli-
entelism and corporatism." Moreover, governments at all levels have
both direct and indirect economic interests in companies. To be sure,
there is considerable debate about the merits of such heavy government
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORM-
ANCE (1990).
49. See, e.g., John Gillespie, Law and Development in "the Market Place": An East
Asian Perspective, in LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA, supra note 5, at 118, 123; Carol
Jones, Capitalism, Globalization and Rule of Law: An Alternative Trajectory of Legal Change
in China, 3 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 195, 212 (1994). Whether Asian countries grew because of,
or in spite of such practices is, of course, much contested.
50. See, e.g., DAVID WANK, COMMODIFYING COMMUNISM: BUSINESS, TRUST, AND POLI-
TICS IN A CHINESE CITY (1999) (describing the importance of clientelism for private
businesses in Xiamen). Corporatism has been put to three main, quite different uses, in China.
Some analysts have used it as it has been used elsewhere-as a way of looking at State-society
relations and as a measure of civil society. See, e.g., Jonathan Unger & Anita Chan, China,
Corporatism, and the East Asian Model, 33 AUSTL. J. CHINESE AFF. 29 (1995). Others have
used it as a way of understanding East Asian statist models of economic development. See,
e.g., MARGARET PEARSON, CHINA'S NEW BUSINESS ELITE: THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF
ECONOMIC REFORM (1997). Still others have used it to explain local forms of government-
business relations. Jean Oi, for instance, uses corporatism to capture the way in which local
governments have treated the local economy as a single corporate entity. JEAN 01, RURAL
CHINA TAKES OFF (1999); see also Andrew G. Walder, The County Government as an Indus-
trial Corporation, in ZOUPING IN TRANSITION 62 (Andrew G. Walder ed., 1998).
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intervention and close government-business relations. While a more lais-
sez-faire economy has its supporters, there is ample support for the view
that China's transition from a centrally planned economy to a market
economy requires a strong (Neo-Authoritarian) government able to make
tough decisions without fear of having to appease the electorate.5 ' Al-
though Statist Socialists and Neo-Authoritarians (and rule by law
proponents) are most likely to adopt such views, most Communitarians
also support them. By way of comparison, Statist Socialists arguably
favor a higher degree of government regulation than Neo-Authoritarians
and Communitarians.
Statist Socialists and Neo-Authoritarians are more likely to favor
corporatist or clientelist relationships between government and business
than might Communitarians, on the grounds that it increases the State's
control over economic activities. All are nonetheless concerned about the
negative effects of corporatism and clientelism, in terms of both eco-
nomic efficiency and increased corruption. Thus, some shift away from
such relationships as they currently exist toward a more open, transpar-
ent process based on generally applicable laws is likely, even if there
ultimately remains a higher degree of interaction between government
and business than in the West.
Public ownership is one pillar, albeit a shaky one, of Jiang Zemin's
socialist rule of law State. While all States allow for some public owner-
ship, Statist Socialists favor somewhat higher levels of public ownership,
more limitations on the kinds of shares that can be held by private and
foreign investors, and more restrictions on private and foreign majority
shareholding in certain industries.
B. The Political Order
Liberal democracies are characterized by genuine democratic elec-
tions for even the highest level of government office, a neutral State in
which the normative agenda for society is determined by the people
through elections, and a limited State with an expansive private sphere
and robust civil society independent of the State.52 In contrast, Statist
51. See Sautman, supra note 42. For a critique of the alleged advantage of authoritarian-
ism, see Jose Maria Maravall, The Myth of the Authoritarian Advantage, 5 J. DEMOCRACY,
Oct. 1994, at 17.
52. For a defense of the neutral State, see, for example, Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113, 127 (Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978); W. Va. Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). For a critique of the claim that liberal democracy is neutral,
see MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW 57-73 (1988). That democracy should
be neutral is contested by communitarians, conservatives, and philosophical perfectionists.
See, for example, Michael Sandel's invocation of John Dewey in Michael Sandel, Dewey
Rides Again, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 9, 1996, at 35 (reviewing ALAN RYAN, JOHN DEWEY
AND THE HIGH TIDE OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM (1995). See also MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOC-
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Socialism is defined by single party rule: elections at only the lowest
level of government and, at present, a nomenklatura system of appoint-
ments whereby the highest level personnel in all government organs,
including the courts, are chosen or approved by the Party. Rather than a
neutral State, the Party in its role as vanguard sets the normative agenda
for society, which currently consists of the four cardinal principles: the
leading role of the Party, adherence to socialism, the dictatorship of the
proletariat, and adherence to Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought.
There is also a smaller private sphere and a correspondingly larger role
for the State in supervising and guiding social activities. If Statist Social-
ists had their way, there would be at most a limited civil society
characterized by a high level of corporatist and clientelist relationships
with government. 3 In these respects, there is little to distinguish Statist
Socialists from rule by law advocates, although the latter might favor an
even more totalitarian form of government.
Neo-Authoritarians prefer single party rule to genuine democracy.
They would either do away with elections, or if that were not politically
feasible, limit elections to lower levels of government. If forced to hold
national level elections, they would attempt to control the outcome of the
elections by imposing limits on the opposition party or monopolizing
major media channels. Like the Statist Socialists, they reject the neutral
State and favor a large role for the government in controlling social ac-
tivities. They would nevertheless tolerate a somewhat smaller role for the
government and a correspondingly larger civil society, albeit one still
subject to restrictions and characterized by clientelism and corporatism.
In contrast, Communitarians favor genuine multiparty democratic
elections at all levels of government, though not necessarily right at the
moment. Given their fear of chaos, distrust of the allegedly ignorant
masses, and lack of requisite institutions, they are willing to postpone
elections for the moment and to accept a gradual step-by-step process
where elections are permitted at successively higher levels of
RACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996). Similarly, wel-
fare liberals allow for a greater role of the State than classical liberals, whereas libertarians
favor an even more restricted role.
53. See Edward X. Gu, "Non-Establishment" Intellectuals, Public Space, and the Crea-
tion of Non-Governmental Organizations in China: The Chen Ziming-Wang Juntao Saga, 39
CHINA J. 40 (1998) (noting the limited space for civil society); see also GORDON WHITE ET
AL., IN SEARCH OF CIVIL SOCIETY: MARKET REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN CONTEMPO-
RARY CHINA (1996) (describing close relations of many civil organizations with the State);
Tony Saich, Negotiating the State: The Development of Social Organizations in China, 161
CHINA Q. 124 (2000) (pointing out that the Leninist tendency to thwart organizational plural-
ity is compounded by the fear of the potential for social unrest resulting from economic
reforms, but also observing that the State's capacity to exert formal control is increasingly
limited).
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government. Like the Statist Socialists and Neo-Authoritarians, they
believe State leaders should determine the normative agenda for society,
and thus allow a larger role for the State in managing social activities
than in a Liberal Democratic State. However, they prefer a somewhat
more expansive civil society. Although some groups, particularly
commercial associations, might find close relationships with the
government helpful, other more social or spiritual groups might not. The
latter would be permitted to go their own way, subject to concerns about
social order, public morality, and specific harms to members of the group
or society at large. Rather than hard or Statist corporatism,
14Communitarians favor a soft or societal version .
C. Perspective on Rights
Liberal Democrats favor a liberal understanding of rights that gives
priority to civil and political rights over economic, social, cultural, and
collective or group rights. Rights are conceived of in deontological terms
as distinct from and normatively superior to interests.5 Rights are con-
sidered to be prior to the good (and interests), both in the sense that
rights "trump" the good/interests, and in that rights are based not on util-
ity, interests, or consequences, but on moral principles whose
justification is derived independent of the good. 6 To protect individuals
and minorities against the tyranny of the majority, rights impose limits
on the interests of others, the good of society, and the will of the major-
ity. Substantively, freedom is privileged over order, individual autonomy
takes precedence over social solidarity and harmony, and freedom of
thought and the right to think win out over both the need for common
ground and right thinking on important social issues.57 Rights are also
emphasized over duties or virtues.
In contrast, Communitarians endorse a communitarian or collectivist
interpretation of human rights that emphasizes the indivisibility of rights.
Greater emphasis is placed on collective rights and the need for
economic growth, even at the expense of individual civil and political
54. For a discussion of hard or Statist corporatism versus soft or societal corporatism, see
HOWARD J. WIARDA, CORPORATISM AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS: THE OTHER GREAT "ISM"
(1997); Philippe Schmitter, Still the Century of Corporatism?, in THE NEW CORPORATISM
(Frederick Pike & Thomas Stritch eds., 1974).
55. Randall Peerenboom, Rights, Interests, and the Interest in Rights in China, 31 STAN.
J. INT'L. L. 359 (1995).
56. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971). Of course, not all liberals accept that the right should be privileged over the
good or endorse a deontological theory of rights.
57. Randall Peerenboom, Confucian Harmony and Freedom of Thought, in CONFUCIAN-
ISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 234 (William Theodore de Bary & Tu Weiming eds., 1998).
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rights. 58 Rather than a deontological conception of rights as anti-
majoritarian trumps on the social good, rights are conceived of in
utilitarian or pragmatic terms as another type of interest to be weighed
against other interests, including the interests of groups and society as
a whole.59 Accordingly, stability is privileged over freedom, social
solidarity and harmony are often more important than autonomy and
freedom of thought, and the right to think is limited by the need for
common ground and consensus on important social issues.
Communitarians, Neo-Authoritarians, Statist Socialists, and rule by law
advocates also pay more attention than do Liberal Democrats to the
development of moral character and virtues and the need to be aware of
one's duties to other individuals, one's family, members of the
community, and the nation.
Like Communitarians, Neo-Authoritarians and Statist Socialists
conceive of rights in utilitarian or pragmatic terms. However, they have a
more State-centered view than Communitarians. Statist Socialists, in
particular, are likely to conceive of rights as positivist grants of the State
and useful tools for strengthening the nation and the ruling regime.
6
0
They are also more likely than Neo-Authoritarians to invoke State
sovereignty, "Asian Values," and the threat of cultural imperialism to
prevent other countries from interfering in their internal affairs while
overseeing the destruction of the communities and traditional cultures
and value systems that they allegedly defend.6' Communitarians and
58. Jack Donnelley refers to the perceived need to limit individual civil and political
rights to ensure development as the "liberty tradeoff." See Jack Donnelley, Human Rights and
Asian Values: A Defense of "Western" Universalism, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS (Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel Bell eds., 1999).
59. Peerenboom, supra note 55, at 361.
60. See Edwards, supra note 28; Andrew Nathan, Sources of Chinese Rights Thinking, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA, supra note 28, at 125.
61. The debate over "Asian Values" has tended to produce more heat than light.
Supporters of universal human rights dismiss the claims of Asian governments as the self-
serving rhetoric of dictators, misrepresenting their position as a morally reprehensible and
philosophically absurd anything-goes cultural relativism. Defenders of "Asian Values" respond
by attacking Western governments for past and present violations of human rights, and accuse
them of cultural imperialism and ethnocentricity. Clearly, authoritarian regimes have at times
used the rhetoric of "Asian Values" for self-serving ends, playing the culture card to deny
citizens their rights and to fend off foreign criticism. Just as clearly, there are many different
voices within Asia, and anyone professing to speak for all Asians or of "Asian Values" runs the
danger of discounting these voices. Yet, we need to be careful not to dismiss "Asian Values" as
merely a cynical strategy seized on by authoritarian regimes to deny Asian citizens their rights.
That some Asian governments use culture as an excuse to deny citizens their rights speaks to
the motives of the governments but tells us little about the substantive merits of their position.
A government's invocation of "Asian Values" may be politically motivated and yet still
accurately reflect the views of the majority of the people. Indeed, Asian governments would
not appeal to "Asian Values" unless such values resonated with the attitudes of their
constituency. More philosophical and nuanced accounts point out that whatever Asian
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Neo-Authoritarians in China are nevertheless likely to object to strong-
arm politics and the use of rights to impose culture-specific values on
China, or to extract trade concessions in the form of greater access to
Chinese markets. 62 Like Communitarians, Neo-Authoritarians and Statist
Socialists also privilege order over freedom. They go even farther than
Communitarians, however, in tilting the scales toward social solidarity
and harmony rather than autonomy, and are willing to impose more
limits on freedom of thought and the right to think. While Neo-
Authoritarians would restrict the right of citizens to criticize the
government, Statist Socialists would impose such broad restrictions that
criticism of the government would be, for all practical purposes,
prohibited. Indeed, Statist Socialists much prefer unity of thought to
freedom of thought, and right thinking to the right to think.63 Were it
possible, without undermining their other goals such as economic
growth, they would return to the strict thought control rule by law regime
of the Mao era. At minimum, they draw the line at public attacks on the
ruling party or challenges to single party socialism. Despite the changes
in society over the last twenty years that have greatly reduced the
effectiveness of "thought work," they continue to emphasize its
importance to ensure common ground and consensus on important social
issues defined by the Party lineTM
The rule by law regime of the Mao era differed from any of these
rule of law regimes in considering the concept of rights as a bourgeois
liberal device to induce false consciousness in the proletariat. Although
the Mao regime included some rights in its various constitutions, such
rights were considered programmatic goals to be realized at some future
date. In addition, duties were privileged over rights, especially duties to
governments' political motivations, there are legitimate differences in values at stake. See, e.g.,
Joseph Chan, The Asian Challenge to Universal Human Rights: A Philosophical Critique, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 25, 38 (James
T.H. Tang ed., 1995); Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Asian Values: The Limits of
Universalism, 7 CHINA REV. INT'L. 295 (2000). See generally THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 58; YASH GHAI, ASIA FOUNDATION'S CENTER FOR ASIA
PACIFIC AFFAIRS, OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 4, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE: THE ASIA
DEBATE (1994); Davis, supra note 40, at 115-31.
62. In a survey of 547 students from thirteen universities in China, 82% claimed that for
other countries to initiate anti-China motions before the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
constituted interference in China's internal affairs; 71% believed that the true aim of the
United States and other countries in censuring China was to use the human rights issue to
attack China and impose sanctions on it, with 69% maintaining that this constituted a form of
power politics. See Students'Attitudes Toward Human Rights Surveyed, BBC SUMMARY OF
WORLD BROADCASTS, FE/3525 G/I 7 (May 4, 1999).
63. Peerenboom, supra note 57.
64. DANIEL LYNCH, AFTER THE PROPAGANDA STATE: MEDIA, POLITICS, AND "THOUGHT
WORK" IN REFORMED CHINA (1999).
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the State; civil society was extremely limited; and efforts at thought con-
trol were pervasive.
D. Purposes of Rule of Law
Proponents of the various conceptions see rule of law serving certain
similar purposes: enhancing predictability and certainty, which promotes
economic growth and allows individuals to plan their affairs, preventing
government arbitrariness, increasing government efficiency and rational-
ity, providing a mechanism for dispute resolution, protecting individual
rights, and bolstering regime legitimacy. They differ, however, with re-
spect to the priorities of the various purposes, their degree of support or
enthusiasm for any given purpose, and the details of how the goals are
interpreted. Broadly stated, Liberal Democrats emphasize the role of rule
of law in limiting the State while protecting the individual against gov-
ernment arbitrariness, whereas Communitarians favor a more balanced
role for rule of law as a means of both limiting and strengthening the
State. In contrast, Neo-Authoritarians place somewhat greater emphasis
on the State-strengthening aspect, which is assigned an even higher pri-
ority by Statist Socialists.
Indeed, although Statist Socialists accept-at least in theory-the
primary requirement of rule of law that government officials and citizens
alike are subject to law and must act in accordance with it, they accept
such limits grudgingly. Not surprisingly, to date the reach of the law has
been limited, with high-level government officials typically subject to a
separate system of Party discipline rather than to the formal legal proc-
ess. Moreover, while Statist Socialists appreciate the benefits of limiting
government arbitrariness, they also prefer a system that allows them suf-
ficient flexibility to pursue their legitimate, and sometimes illegitimate,
ends. Although they regularly declare that rule 'of law is necessary to
protect individual rights, it is not a high priority. The ability of the legal
system to protect individual rights is therefore severely hampered by
their statist conception of rights and extreme emphasis on stability and
order over freedom.
Differences in the purposes of rule of law are evident in the weights
attached to stability. All-even Liberal Democrats-agree that stability
is important. Clearly one purpose of law in Western traditions has been
to prevent anarchy and a Hobbesian war of all against all. China, for its
part, has suffered tremendous upheaval in the last 150 years, from the
uprisings against and eventual collapse of the Qing to the chaos and in-
ternal struggles of the Republican period to the turbulence of the anti-
rightist movement, the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution
of the Mao era. With a quarter of the world's population, many of them
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below or near the poverty level, China (and the rest of the world) can
hardly afford political chaos or anarchy. Current economic reforms have
already resulted in massive unemployment and rising unrest. As reforms
continue and unemployment rises, the potential for traumatic disruptions
of the social order increases .
Rule of law could serve the goal of stability in a variety of ways.
First, it could limit arbitrary acts of government. One major source of
instability in the last fifty years has been the Party itself and the arbi-
trariness of senior leaders. One of the main reasons for promoting rule of
law after the death of Mao was to avoid the chaos of the Cultural Revo-
lution where the whims of Party leaders substituted for laws. Rule of law
is meant to make governance more regular and predictable. It is also
needed to address the perennial problem confronting socialist regimes of
political succession. 66 Whereas the death of Mao set off a struggle for
power, rule of law is supposed to ensure a more seemly and seamless
transition of power.67
Rule of law also serves stability by regularizing central-local rela-
tions. Conflicts between the central and local governments have
increased dramatically as a result of economic reforms that have given
local governments both more authority and responsibility. In their desire
to promote local economic development, local governments regularly
ignore central laws and policies, issue regulations that are inconsistent
with national level laws, or engage in local protectionism. While there
seems little chance of the central government losing control over local
governments to the point where local governments emerge as Republi-
can-era type warlords, as some alarmists have suggested, authority has
become fragmented to such an extent that China arguably now has a de
facto federalist form of government.68 Predictably, Jiang Zemin and other
Statist Socialists emphasize the value of rule of law as a means of disci-
plining local governments and recentralizing power.
65. For an analysis of the likelihood of China becoming unstable and the factors that
might contribute to it, see Shambaugh, supra note 44. The contributors discuss conflicts
among the ruling elite and government-military relations, the declining role of the Party at the
grass-roots level, economic reforms, urban and rural unrest, and minority regions.
66. Wang, supra note 13, at 119.
67. In fact, the transition from Deng to Jiang was relatively smooth, as has been the re-
cent shuffling of top leaders, including L.i Peng's move from the State Council to the National
People's Congress (NPC) when his term expired. To be sure, one could question what, if any-
thing, rule of law had to do with it. Nevertheless, the fact that there are term limits does
provide the backdrop against which political maneuvering occurs. In any event, the hope is
that in the future, succession will proceed in accordance with legal rules, and that when senior
officials reach the end of their terms they will step down or move to another post as required
by law.
68. See YASHENG HUANG, INFLATION AND INVESTMENT CONTROLS IN CHINA (1996).
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On the other hand, some scholars note that stability is often a code
word in Chinese politics for greater centralization of power, an emphasis
on collective over individual rights, and continued Party dominance.69 In
this view, the government's emphasis on stability is overstated and is
really just an attempt to limit challenges to Party rule. Former Vice
Director of China Academy of Social Sciences, Li Shenzhi, for instance,
argues that subsistence is no longer such a major problem and therefore
more emphasis should be placed on political reform and citizens' civil
and political rights.7° Similarly, Yu Keping has argued that political re-
form need not lead to instability.7' To some extent, the differences turn on
empirical issues. How unstable is China? How likely is it that the activi-
ties of any one dissident, or even a group of dissidents, could endanger
national security? They also reflect fundamental differences in values.
Although all appreciate the need for stability, liberals would place
greater importance on freedom whereas Statist Socialists, Neo-
Authoritarians, and Communitarians would privilege, to varying degrees,
order over freedom.
Broad agreement over other purposes also gives way to subtle differ-
ences upon further probing. All agree, for instance, that predictability
and certainty are crucial for economic growth. Yet, predictability and
certainty may serve other purposes as well. Liberal Democrats value
predictability because it enhances freedom by allowing people to plan
their affairs and realize their ends in life, thus promoting human dig-
nity.72 Underlying this view is a liberal view of the self as a moral agent
that emphasizes autonomy and the importance of making moral choices.
Not all ethical traditions share this view of the self or place such impor-
tance on making choices. The dominant Chinese view of the self as
social, and the Confucian emphasis on doing what is right rather than the
right to choose, call into question justifications of rule of law that appeal
to this interpretation of human dignity.73 Of course, the ability to plan
69. Noting that the Party contends that stability entails the continued dominance of the
Party, Stanley Lubman has pointed out that the rule of law co-exists in the Constitution with
the ideals of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. STANLEY LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL
REFORMS IN CHINA AFTER MAO (1999). Shi Taifeng asserts that whereas the purpose of rule
of law is to limit the State, in China the purpose of rule of law is to ensure stability and that
the current regime remains in power. This view is typical of the Statist Socialist variety but not
of the others. Establish a Socialist Rule of Law State, supra note 10, at 13.
70. Li Shenzhi, Yei Yao Tuidong Zhengzhi Gaige [Push Ahead with Political Reforms
Too], in POLITICAL CHINA, supra note 15, at 21.
71. Yu Keping, Zouchu "Zhengzhi Gaige-Shehuiwending" de Liangnan Jingdi [A Way
Out of the Dilemma: "Political Reform-Social Stability"], in POLITICAL CHINA, supra note
15, at 49-53.
72. FINNIS, supra note 15, at 272; RAZ, supra note 2, at 221.
73. See Peerenboom, supra note 57, at 245. Joseph Chan, for example, develops a Confu-
cian alternative to a liberal or Kantian conception of moral autonomy. The former is a more
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one's affairs is valuable, to some degree, in China. However, the weight
attached to the ability to plan one's affairs and the reasons given in sup-
port are likely to differ between Liberal Democrats and the others, with
Statist Socialists assigning it the least weight.
7
1
Similarly, ail hope that rule of law will enhance the legitimacy of the
ruling regime. However, by allowing elections and ample opportunities
for public participation in lawmaking, administrative rulemaking, and
interpretation and implementation processes, legitimacy for Liberal De-
mocrats and Communitarians is based on consent. In contrast, in the
absence of elections and with only limited opportunities for public par-
ticipation, legitimacy for Statist Socialists and Neo-Authoritarians is
primarily performance based: that is, legitimacy depends on whether the
laws, the legal system, and the regime as a whole, produce good results. 6
In contrast, in a rule by law regime, law is merely a tool to serve the
interests of the State, and there are no meaningful legal limits on the rul-
ers. Law serves the State by enhancing government efficiency, although
that goal is often compromised by the heavily politicized nature of law
and the dominance of policy. Law is not meant to protect the rights of
individuals. Whereas rule of law regimes rely on the courts to resolve
disputes, in the Mao era, for example, the formal legal system was used
primarily to suppress enemies. Disputes among the people were settled
through mediation, and economic conflicts between State-owned entities
were resolved administratively or by Party organs.
E. Institutions and Practices
According to Max Weber, the defining feature of a modern legal sys-
tem that merits the label rule of law is autonomy. Law is distinct from
politics, and independent judges decide cases impartially in accordance
with generally applicable laws using a distinct type of legal reasoning.
To be sure, the line between politics and law is not always a clear one, as
minimal conception of autonomy than the latter, and supports civil liberties to a lesser degree.
Joseph Chan, Moral Autonomy, Civil Liberties, and Confucianism, 52 PHIL. E. & W. (forth-
coming 2002).
74. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 13.
75. A survey of academics, think tank experts, officials, businesspersons, journalists, and
religious and cultural leaders found significant differences between Asians and Americans.
The former chose an orderly society, harmony, and accountability of public values, in de-
scending order, as the three most important societal values. In contrast, the Americans chose
freedom of expression, personal freedom, and the rights of the individual. See Susan Sim,
Human Rights: Bridging the Gulf, STRAITS TIMES (SING.), Oct. 21, 1995.
76. Jiang Zemin seems to believe that rule of law can help shore up the regime's legiti-
macy in a more direct way by providing a normative basis for a market economy.
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Critical Legal Scholars repeatedly remind us.77 Nevertheless, as Alice
Tay observes, "The difference between law and decree, between gov-
ernment proclamation and administrative power on the one hand and the
genuine rule of law on the other, is perfectly well understood in all those
countries where rule of law is seriously threatened or has been abol-
ished."78
While the outer extremes between a system dominated by politics-
such as the legal system in the Mao era, particularly during the Cultural
Revolution-and a rule of law system in which legal institutions and
actors enjoy a high degree of autonomy are reasonably clear, there is
considerable room for variation in the middle. Advocates of alternative
conceptions of rule of law are likely to disagree over where to draw the
line between law and politics due in part to their divergent views about
the economy, the political order, the nature and limits of rights, and the
purposes that law is meant to serve.
Liberal Democrats favor a high degree of independence and auton-
omy. The legislature that makes laws is freely elected rather than
appointed by the ruling party. The judiciary as a whole and individual
judges are independent. Judges generally enjoy lifetime tenure and can
be removed only for limited reasons and in accordance with strict proce-
dures. The appointment process is relatively non-politicized.7 9 There are
a variety of mechanisms for reining in administrative discretion, and the
legal system is capable of holding even top-level government officials
accountable. The legal profession is independent and often self-
governing.
At the other end of the spectrum, Statist Socialists favor only a
moderate to low level of separation between law and politics. In keeping
with the minimal requirements of rule of law, Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) policy is now to be transformed into laws and regulations by
entities authorized to make law in accordance with the stipulated
procedures for lawmaking, 0 whereas in the Mao era CCP policies
substituted for or trumped laws.8 Although the legislature is not freely
77. See generally THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., 3d
ed. 1998).
78. Alice Ehr-Soon Tay, Communist Visions, Communist Realities, and the Role of Law,
17 J.L. & Soc'Y 155 (1990).
79. In practice, the degree of politicization varies widely from country to country. See
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE (Shimon Shetreet & Jules Deschenes
eds., 1985).
80. The greater reliance on laws rather than CCP policy is widely acknowledged to be
one of the hallmarks of the post-Mao era. See, e.g., Thomas Jones & Susan Finder, PRC Law:
A Millennium Retrospective, 13 CHINA L. & PRAC. 53, 54 (Dec.-Jan. 1999-2000).
81. See Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making Under Mao, 1949-68: An Overview, in
CHINA: MANAGEMENT OF A REVOLUTIONARY SOCIETY (John M. H. Lindbeck ed., 1971);
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elected, Party influence on the lawmaking processes has diminished
radically since the beginning of reforms. 2 To be sure, like ruling parties
in parliamentary systems in other countries, the Party is able to ensure
that major policy initiatives become law when it is united and willing to
expend the political capital to do so."
Statist Socialists also favor a more limited judicial independence.
Courts have a functional independence in the sense that other branches
of government are not to interfere in the way courts handle specific
cases. Unlike the Mao era, courts may decide cases without Party ap-
proval of the judgment.4 However, the courts may still be subject to
macro-supervision by the National People's Congress (NPC), the procu-
racy, and other State organs, and even Party organs. While the courts as a
whole enjoy limited functional independence, the autonomy and inde-
pendence of individual judges is even more restricted. Accordingly, a
panel of judges decides most cases, and a special adjudicative supervi-
sion committee within the court has the right to review particular
decisions in case of manifest error.
The legal profession is granted a similar partial independence. Al-
though not the "workers of the State" of the Mao era, lawyers still must
meet political correctness standards to practice law and pass the annual
inspection test.85 While the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) shares responsibil-
ity for supervising the legal profession with lawyers associations, the
MOJ retains most of the authority, including the power to punish law-
yers. In part because of such political reasons, but mainly due simply to
KENNETH LIEBERTHAL & MICHEL OKSENBERG, POLICY MAKING IN CHINA: LEADERS,
STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES (1988).
82. See MURRAY SCOTT TANNER, THE POLITICS OF LAWMAKING IN CHINA (1999); Mi-
chael Dowdle, The Constitutional Development and Operations of the National People's
Congress, II COLUM. J. ASIAN L. I (1997).
83. See P. P. CRAIG, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 74 (3d ed. 1994) (expressing the idea that "the
government can always ensure that its policies become law in much the way that it desires");
G. Craenen, Legislators, in THE INSTITUTIONS OF FEDERAL BELGIUM 71, 77 (G. Craenen ed.,
1996) (describing a change in center of gravity away from the Parliament to the Executive
such that the latter is able to "push its initiatives to the foreground and to obtain from Parlia-
ment what it considers necessary" and arguing that Parliament's main function is now less
legislative and more to keep the government in check). This is not to claim that the Party is on
all fours with ruling parties in parliamentary liberal democracies.
84. In fact, Party interference in specific cases is rare; interference by government offi-
cials motivated by local protectionism is much more common. See FAZHI DE LIXIANG YU
XIANSHU [THE IDEAL AND REALITY OF RULE OF LAW] (Xiangrui Gong ed., 1993) [hereinafter
IDEAL AND REALITY OF RULE OF LAW].
85. See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, LAWYERS IN CHINA: OBSTACLES TO INDEPENDENCE
AND THE DEFENSE OF RIGHTS (1998) (noting there are no reported cases in which a political
litmus test was invoked to deny a license).
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corruption and rent-seeking by the MOJ and its local affiliates, lawyers
try to forge close clientelist relations with the MOJ.
8 6
In the administrative law area, government officials are granted con-
siderable discretion, in part so that they may be more responsive to shifts
in Party policy, but mainly for other reasons, such as the need to respond
quickly and flexibly to a rapidly changing economic environment.87 Lim-
its on civil society, freedom of the press, and public participation in the
law-making, interpretation, and implementation processes make it diffi-
cult for the public to monitor government officials. The lack of elections
eliminates whatever leverage the public has over officials resulting from
the possibility of voting the current government out of office.
Neo-Authoritarians prefer a moderate separation between law and
politics. As with Statist Socialism, the legislature is not elected. How-
ever, Neo-Authoritarians favor greater judicial independence than Statist
Socialists, although many would still limit the independence of the
courts and individual judges in various ways. For instance, they may pre-
fer China's unitary system in which the NPC is supreme and exercises
supervision over the courts to a U.S.-style separation of powers system.
On the other hand, they support the development of a more professional
and honest civil service, and an administrative law system capable of
reining in wayward government officials and combating corruption.88
They also advocate greater public participation and more expansive-
though still limited-freedom of association, speech, and the press so
that the public can play a greater role in monitoring government offi-
cials.
The primary purpose of administrative law, however, remains ra-
tional and efficient governance, rather than protection of individual
rights. The elite corps of civil servants is given considerable flexibility in
formulating and implementing administrative rules, which are the main
form of legislation in daily governance. The legal profession would be
granted limited independence and subject to supervision by the MOJ,
albeit a cleaner and more professional one. Nevertheless, lawyers would
still seek to establish clientelist ties to the MOJ due to its control over
licensing for special forms of business and other commercial reasons."
86. See Randall Peerenboom, Law Enforcement and the Legal Profession, in IMPLEMEN-
TATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Chen Jianfu et al. eds., 2001)
(discussing rent-seeking and importance of clientelist ties to justice ministry and bureaus).
87. This paragraph depicts the current situation. See Peerenboom, supra note 46.
88. See, e.g., Pan, supra note 34. Statist Socialists might also favor an honest and profes-
sional civil service, though they may put greater emphasis on ideology and political factors in
appointing civil servants and prefer that Party discipline committees be responsible for dealing
with corruption among senior officials.
89. Communitarians share a view of the legal profession similar to the Neo-
Authoritarians, though they view the legal profession's obligations as being more toward
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Communitarians prefer a moderate to high degree of separation be-
tween law and politics. The legislature would be freely elected. There
would be ample opportunities for public participation in rule creation,
interpretation, and implementation. The public would also be able to
throw out a government that is corrupt or performs poorly; as a whole,
the administrative law system would be sufficiently strong to hold even
top level government officials accountable. Although Communitarians
are sympathetic to the argument that a strong economy-particularly in
times of transition-requires a strong executive, they balance the need
for efficient government against the need to protect individual rights.
Moreover, like the Liberal Democrats, they support an autonomous judi-
ciary, with life tenure for judges and relatively apolitical processes for
appointing and removing judges. At the same time, they reject the liberal
notion of a neutral State. Accordingly, they favor the practice whereby
courts decide cases in light of a substantive moral agenda for society
determined by the ruling elite. In that sense, they do not differ from
Statist Socialists or Neo-Authoritarians.
Rather, what distinguishes them is the particular normative agenda.
The Communitarians believe that judges should emphasize harmony,
stability, and the interests of the community over the interests of indi-
viduals, as well as economic development. Neo-Authoritarians and State
Socialists agree in general but place more emphasis on economic devel-
opment and upholding the authority of the State. In particular, Statist
Socialists insist that the courts uphold the four cardinal principles-a
position not supported by either Neo-Authoritarians or Communitarians.
F. Rules
Although there is room for disagreement among Liberal Democrats
on specific issues, on the whole Liberal Democrats prefer liberal laws.
Liberal laws provide strong protections for broadly defined civil and po-
litical rights.. For some, free speech may .be subject to only narrow time,
place, and manner restrictions. Social groups are free to organize without
having to register with government authorities. Persons accused of
crimes have the right to a lawyer, who may be present at all stages of
formal interrogation; the accused may only be held for a very limited
society than the State and differ over specific issues, such as when lawyers' obligations to the
State and society will trump their obligations to their clients.
90. LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA, supra note 5, at 19 (arguing that judicial in-
dependence in East Asia is influenced by a statist ideology that rejects the liberal notion of a
neutral State in favor of a paternalist State which grounds its legitimacy in its superior ability
to fathom what constitutes "the good" for society; thus, Jayasuriya claims, courts are more
likely to serve as an instrument for the implementation of the policy objectives of the State
and ruling elite).
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time without being charged; and the State may not rely on illegally ob-
tained evidence in making its case. Euthanasia laws may allow
individuals to choose to end their life or to ask others to assist them in
doing so. Parents may keep their children out of the schools and educate
them at home if they choose.
Communitarians, Neo-Authoritarians, and Statist Socialists all en-
dorse laws that limit individual freedom to one extent or another. All
allow registration requirements for social groups to ensure public order.
All accept substantive limits on speech as well as time, place, and man-
ner of speech. No one is free to walk into a courtroom with a jacket that
says, "Fuck the Draft" on it.9 Flag burning is outlawed. The accused has
a right to a lawyer, but only after the police have had an initial opportu-
nity to question them. The accused may be held for longer periods
without being charged, and the period may be extended upon approval
by the authorities. Illegally obtained evidence may be used in certain
instances, though forced confessions and police torture are not allowed.
Children are required to attend State-authorized schools, and to study a
curriculum approved by the Ministry of Education. More controversially,
Statist Socialists and Neo-Authoritarians-and perhaps even Communi-
tarians-endorse broadly drafted laws to protect the State and social
order, such as State secrets laws and prohibitions against endangering
the State.
G. Outcomes in Specific Cases
Institutions in a broad sense include ideology, purposes, organiza-
tional structures and cultures, norms, practices, rules, and outcomes in
specific cases.92 Although I have separated them for the sake of a clearer
exposition, in reality they overlap and blend together, as evidenced by
the following examples concerning constitutional, administrative, and
criminal law."
In general, constitutions in socialist countries have played a very dif-
ferent role than constitutions in Liberal Democratic rule of law States, in
91. In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the U.S. Supreme Court held that an in-
dividual's right to free speech extends to wearing a jacket with "Fuck the Draft" on it in court,
even though others may find such language offensive.
92. NORTH, supra note 48.
93. Indeed, focusing on each dimension separately is somewhat misleading. While differ-
ent regime types tend to be correlated with different institutions and rules, in some cases
advocates of alternative conceptions of rule of law might espouse seemingly similar purposes
or adopt similar institutions or rules. Yet in practice the outcomes will still differ widely. This
is to be expected in that there is generally some degree of indeterminacy to legal rules. Thus,
even in the United States, for example, conservative judges are likely to come to different
conclusions in some cases than liberal judges, notwithstanding the fact that they share the
same institutional context.
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part because socialist States have made little pretense of abiding by the
basic requirements of rule of law and accepting any constitutional limits
on the ruling regime's power.9" Reflecting their origins in Enlightenment
theories of social contract, liberal constitutions emphasize a limited State
and a separation between State and society. Rule of law plays a central
role in imposing limits on the State and protecting the individual against
an overreaching government by ensuring that the State does not encroach
on the fundamental rights of individuals .set out in the constitution.
Liberal constitutions set out fundamental principles that are supposed to
stand the test of time, including the basic rights of citizens.
In contrast, socialist constitutions are characterized by frequent
change. The frequent change in socialist constitutions is consistent with
socialist legal theory, which conceives of law as a superstructure reflect-
ing the economic basis of society and in particular the ownership of the
material modes of production. When the economic base changes, law-
and the constitution-must change accordingly. Moreover, because
Marxism posits an evolution toward an ideal State, when the economy
passes through various stages, amendment of the constitution is ex-
pected. In the PRC, the 1978 Constitution was replaced in 1982 by a
more market-oriented Constitution that reflected Deng Xiaoping's eco-
nomic open-door and reform policies. The 1982 Constitution has
subsequently been amended three times as economic reforms have deep-
ened and the economy has steadily moved away from a centrally planned
economy toward a more market-oriented economy. Each time the
amendments incorporated the more market-oriented policies.
Although changes in PRC constitutions reflect transformations in the
economic base of society, they also reflect fundamental shifts in political
power. Again, this is entirely consistent with socialist legal theory, which
conceives of law as a tool of the ruling class. Whereas in a capitalist so-
ciety law serves the bourgeoisie, in a socialist State law allegedly serves
the people. In a Leninist socialist State, however, the Party acts as the
vanguard of the people. Thus law becomes a tool of the Party. The con-
stitution changes when there are major changes in Party leadership or
Party policy." The 1954 Constitution therefore reflected the victory of
the CCP and the Party's consolidation of power. The 1975 Cultural
Revolution Constitution codified Mao's victory over his opponents and
embodied his radical vision for a society that must engage in permanent
revolution and ceaseless class struggle to defend socialism against the
94. Yash Ghai, Constitutions and Governance in Africa: A Prolegonenon, in LAW AND
CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD 51, 51-52 (Sammy Adelman & Abdul Paliwala eds., 1993).
95. See generally Jerome Cohen, China's Changing Constitution, 76 CHINA Q. 794
(1978); William Jones, The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, 63 WASH. U. L.Q.
707 (1985).
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enemy within and abroad. The short-lived 1978 Constitution signaled
Deng's victory over Mao loyalists, the turn toward a more law-based
order, and the need to concentrate on economic development rather than
class struggle.
However, Deng had yet to consolidate his power. By 1982, he was
firmly in control. Thus the 1982 Constitution confirmed the new
emphasis on economic development. It also continued the trend, which
began in the 1978 Constitution, to downplay the dominance of the CCP,
separate the Party from government, and turn over the functions of day-
to-day governance to State organs. 96 Although the 1982 Constitution
incorporated Deng's four cardinal principles, they were placed in the
preamble. In contrast, the principles of the supremacy of the law and that
no individual or party is beyond the law were incorporated into the body
of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the Constitution did not explicitly
endorse rule of law, even a socialist rule of law, until the amendment in
1999.
What role the Constitution will play in the future depends in part on
which version of rule of law prevails. Should Statist Socialism win out,
given the relatively low level of separation between law and politics, the
Constitution is likely to continue to change frequently to reflect major
changes in policies as determined by State leaders. Because Statist So-
cialists see rule of law as a means to strengthen the State, the role of the
Constitution in protecting rights will remain limited. The Constitution
might not be directly justiciable; individuals would generally be able to
avail themselves of the rights provided in the Constitution only if such
rights are implemented by specific legislation. On the other hand, even if
Statist Socialism prevails, the Constitution is likely to play a more im-
portant role as a baseline for measuring the legitimacy of State actions.
To maintain credibility, the ruling regime will have to take the Constitu-
tion more seriously. As a result, the ruling regime will appeal to the
Constitution more often to justify its acts. Indicative of the transition
toward rule of law, Beijing has already begun to appeal to the Constitu-
tion at critical times, including when the government imposed martial
law in 1989 and banned Falungong in 1999.
The Constitution will play an even more important role if a Neo-
Authoritarian or Communitarian form of rule of law is adopted. Al-
though the tension between strengthening and limiting the State would
still be manifest in constitutional law, there would at minimum be
greater emphasis on individual rights. As a result, the Constitution would
96. Andrew Nathan, Political Rights in Chinese Constitutions, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA, supra note 28, at 77, 112-20.
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probably become directly justiciable.97 It might also be subject to less
change. The process for amending the Constitution would differ, at least
for Communitarians. Whereas non-elected State leaders would make the
decision to amend the Constitution for Statist Socialists and Neo-
Authoritarians, democratically elected representatives would make the
decision in a Communitarian State.
Like constitutional law, the administrative law regime will vary de-
pending on which version of rule of law wins out. Until recently in
China, the main purpose of administrative law was to facilitate efficient
administration. This view has now largely given way to the belief that
administrative law must strike a balance between protecting the rights of
individuals and promoting government efficiency.98 Although the tension
between the two goals is evident in every system, how China balances
the two will depend on which of the various alternatives of rule of law is
adopted. To date, there is very limited public participation in the admin-
istrative law process. An Administrative Procedure Law is being drafted,
however, that will increase opportunities for public participation. Should
the Communitarian or even the Neo-Authoritarian conception prevail,
one should expect the law to allow for greater public participation than if
the Statist Socialist conception prevailed.
Differences in conceptions of rule of law are also evident in the out-
comes of administrative litigation cases. PRC courts have been reluctant
to aggressively review administrative decisions. On the whole, they have
shown considerable deference to administrative agencies, for example,
by interpreting very narrowly the abuse of authority standard for quash-
ing administrative decisions. In particular, they have been reluctant to
interpret abuse of authority to include a concept of fundamental rights,
as have courts in some Western liberal democracies. 9  There are many
97. Many PRC scholars maintain that the Constitution should be justiciable. See, e.g.,
Wang Chenguang, Falii de kesuxing: Xiandai fazhi guojia zhong fali de tezheng zhiyi [Justi-
ciability of Law: One Characteristic of a Modern Rule of Law Country], 8 FAXUE YANJIU 18-
22 (1998). Interestingly, the Supreme People's Court recently issued a potentially landmark
interpretation in its reply to an inquiry from Shandong High People's Court. The Supreme
Court stated that the plaintiff's basic right to an education as provided in the Constitution
should be protected even though there was no implementing law regarding the right to educa-
tion. While a number of questions remain as to the Court's interpretation, it would appear that
the decision opens the door to parties to directly invoke the Constitution when at least their
basic (jiben) constitutional rights have been violated, even in the absence of implementing
legislation, thus making the Constitution directly justiciable. See Supreme People's Court
Reply No. 25 (Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongbao, Aug. 13, 2001).
98. See, e.g., XIANDAI XINGZHENGFA DE PINGHENG Li LUN [THE BALANCE THEORY OF
MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] (Luo Haocai ed., 1997) [hereinafter BALANCE THEORY OF
MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW].
99. Compare CRAIG, supra note 83, at 17-18 (claiming the standard of ultra vires is be-
ing reinterpreted along lines consistent with respect for fundamental rights in the United
Kingdom), with Minxin Pei, Citizens v. Mandarins: Administrative Litigation in China, 152
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reasons for the courts' deference other than ideology, including institu-
tional limits on the power of the courts."° Even setting aside the various
institutional obstacles, however, PRC courts are less likely than their
counterparts in Liberal Democratic States to take full advantage of the
abuse of authority standard as a means to protect individual rights and
rein in government officials at the expense of government efficiency
given the weak support for liberalism in China.
Criminal law is another area where outcomes are especially sensitive
to differences in ideology and in the conceptions of rule of law. In light
of the importance of stability to most Chinese,'0 ' civil and political rights
are likely to be subject to more limits than in Liberal Democratic States.
Statist Socialists in particular will object to criticisms of the government
that challenge single party socialism. Accordingly, the continued perse-
cution of dissidents is likely to continue if Statist Socialists (and perhaps
if Neo-Authoritarians) prevail. At present, the authorities often rely on
reeducation through labor (lao jiao), an administrative sanction whereby
dissidents may be detained for one to three years, with a possible exten-
sion for another year, without many of the procedural rights afforded
criminal suspects under the Criminal Procedure Law.' 2 Although Liberal
Democrats object to reeducation through labor, others are likely to sup-
port it as necessary for social stability. Hence the complete elimination
of reeducation through labor does not appear to be politically feasible at
this point. Arguably, the best that Liberal Democrats can hope for is that
the process is changed to incorporate more procedural protections of the
kind incorporated in the Criminal Procedure Law.
On the other hand, rule of law is not infinitely elastic. Any supporter
of rule of law will question the manner in which the government has
suppressed dissidents. Even in criminal cases, dissidents are often denied
their rights under the Criminal Procedure Law, including a right to an
open trial, to communicate with their lawyers and families, and so on. '°3
In short, the outcomes of many particular issues will turn on the spe-
cific substantive moral, political, and economic beliefs that define a
CHINA Q. 832, 856 table 12 (1997) (reporting that "abuse of authority" was invoked in only 16
of 219 cases where PRC courts quashed the illegal acts of agencies in comparison to 60 times
for "exceeding legal authority' 48 for "insufficient principal evidence," 40 for "incorrect ap-
plication of law" and even 32 for violation of legal procedures).
100. Peerenboom, supra note 46, at 214-18.
101. See LOLLAR, supra note 8 and accompanying text; Pei, supra note 8 and accompa-
nying text.
102. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, OPENING TO REFORM? AN ANALYSIS OF
CHINA's REVISED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW 65-67 (1996).
103. Id. at 56-60; see also Human Rights Watch World Report 1998: China (Dec. 8,
1998), available at http://www.hrw.org/hrw/campaigns/china-98/chn-wr98.htm (last visited
Mar. 21, 2002).
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particular thick conception of rule of law. How much criticism of gov-
ernment should be allowed and under what circumstances? Should one
be able to use offensive language in public? Should beggars be allowed
on the street? Under what circumstances can someone be stopped and
searched? Do the police need a warrant to enter your house and, if so,
how and when can they obtain one? Must individuals carry an identifica-
tion card? Is the "anger of the people" a legitimate basis for meting out
capital punishment? Should adultery be a crime? Are gay marriages con-
sistent with family values, a way of strengthening a newly envisioned
family, or a threat to the very notion of family? Liberal Democrats,
Communitarians, Neo-Authoritarians, and Statist Socialists will disagree
over these issues and, indeed, there will be many disagreements within
any given school of thought, just as there are many disagreements over
such issues in countries known for Liberal Democratic rule of law. De-
spite such disagreements, there is also considerable common ground
about the basic requirements of rule of law as captured in thin theories,
and general acceptance that rule of law differs from rule by law in that
the former entails meaningful legal limits on the government actors.
III. A RESPONSE TO SEVERAL COMMON CRITIQUES
The suggestion that China is in transition toward rule of law, though
not a Liberal Democratic rule of law, gives rise to a number of theoreti-
cal and practical issues. Some of the criticisms are common to rule of
law theories in general. Others are more China-specific.
A. Specifying the Minimal Conditions for Rule of Law:
Will We Know Rule of Law in China When We See It?
One common objection to thin versions in China and abroad is that
they are inadequately theorized.' 4 Even acknowledging considerable
agreement about the basic elements, there is still considerable room for
disagreement about the details. Some of the elements are vague, a matter
of degree, and subject to exceptions. What precisely is meant by consis-
tent? Some laws may not be directly contradictory, but may have
inconsistent purposes. Some laws are clearer than others. Sometimes
104. Of course, given the wide diversity of legal systems and the fact that even a thin
theory implicates numerous normative and culture-specific issues, the incompletely theorized
nature of rule of law theories is both an advantage and a disadvantage. On the positive side, it
may allow people who disagree about certain theoretical issues to agree on more specific is-
sues that arise in practice. For instance, one may disagree about what structural arrangements
best ensure judicial independence and yet still agree that the current lack of judicial independ-
ence is a problem. For a discussion of the virtues of incompletely theorized arguments, see
CASS SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 3-7 (1996).
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laws are changed and even made effective retroactively. 5 The notion of
equality before the law raises the question of equal in what respect: what
are the morally and legally relevant factors in deciding whether two peo-
ple are similarly situated?'0 The general principle of supremacy of the
law may in some cases need to give way to higher moral principles and
considerations of equity or justified civil disobedience.' 7
At times, various elements and goals may conflict. Replacing a
number of vague rules with clearer ones would result in greater clarity
105. Stephen Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 TEx. L. REV. 425 (1982).
106. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
107. When particular laws may be set aside to secure other values is a difficult theoreti-
cal issue. One of the criticisms of rule of law is that it tends to degenerate into rule fetishism.
Rule of law promotes obedience to laws, whether such laws are good or bad, appropriate in
the particular context or not. Most people, however, would allow that in some cases laws
should give way to higher values, though they may disagree about the particular instances
when laws should give way, who has the right to decide, the standards for making the deci-
sion, whether the discretion ceded the decisionmaker to follow the rules is subject to review
and if so by whom, and so forth. See Ren6 David, Source of Law, in INTERNATIONAL ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW (1984) for a discussion of the way different legal systems
attempt to incorporate or appeal to higher values.
Just as individuals may differ over such issues, so may societies, given their different ethi-
cal traditions. Many of the most dominant Westem ethical traditions have tended to focus on
establishing the proper rules to guide interpersonal interactions, such as the Ten Command-
ments, the Kantian Categorical Imperative, the utilitarian principle of maximization of the
good, or Rawls's two principles of justice (though there are exceptions of course, including
Aristotelian ethics, pragmatism, and situational ethics). Moreover, such rules tend to be ab-
stract and universally applicable to all contexts. Accordingly, many in Western countries who
have been influenced by such traditions may be more willing than those influenced by other
traditions to accept a narrowly circumscribed rule of law that sacrifices equity and particular-
ized justice for the virtues of generality, equality, impartiality, and certainty that result from
limiting the discretion of the decisionmaker. In contrast, Chinese ethical traditions whether
Confucian, Daoist, or Maoist, have rejected rule ethics and universal principles in favor of a
context-specific, pragmatic, situational ethics. See DAVID L. HALL & ROGER AMES, THINKING
THROUGH CONFUCIUS (1987); RANDALL PEERENBOOM, LAW AND MORALITY IN ANCIENT
CHINA: THE SILK MANUSCRIPTS OF HUANG-LAO (1993). In the past, Confucian and Daoist
sages were responsible for determining what was best in a given situation based on their own
judgment rather than by appeal to fixed laws or universal ethical principles. More recently,
socialist leaders and government officials have claimed the same right. Indeed, one of the most
striking features of the legal system in China today is the wide discretion ceded government
officials to interpret and implement the law.
China may well differ from other countries with respect to the ease with which law may
be shoved aside to accommodate other values. (A strict interpretation of rule of law that does
not allow for any deviations from the rules will simply result in rule of law giving way to other
values more often.) Nevertheless, theoretical disagreement over this issue does not call into
question the basic premise that law is to be supreme or that law is meant to constrain the arbi-
trary acts of the government. To be sure, the effectiveness of law as a restraint on the
government will depend in practice on how easily law may be shunted aside. Further, at some
point, routine disregard of the law will raise questions as to a society's commitment to rule of
law, though it is important to bear in mind that there may be other explanations why laws are
not followed in practice, including that the laws are poorly drafted, unworkable in practice, or
the product of a bygone era and out of step with present-day realities.
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and perhaps predictability in the long run, but would lead to instability
and greater unpredictability in the short run. A more fundamental objec-
tion is that the notion of "meaningful restraints" on the State and State
actors is too vague. Legal systems differ both in the degree and in the
nature or manner of restraints on the State and State actors.
Put differently, if we accept, as we must, that implementation of the
rule of law ideal is always a matter of degree, then the question arises as
to when a system merits the label rule of law. There are several possible
approaches to this problem. The first approach tries to provide an ac-
count of deviations from the ideal that, individually or collectively, are
so serious as to be incompatible with rule of law.' 8 It seeks to answer the
questions: At what point do (relatively minor) shortcomings and devia-
tions from the ideal of rule of law, taken collectively, tip the scales such
that the system no longer merits the label rule of law? Alternatively, are
there some types of shortcomings that are so serious that they alone are
sufficient to show the absence of rule of law (and the presence of rule by
law)? For example, if the president and other senior-most officials are
not likely to be impeached or held accountable for illegal acts but all
other officials are held accountable, is that an imperfect-even a deeply
flawed-rule of law, or simply not rule of law at all? Is a legal system
that routinely deprives dissidents and opposition political figures of a fair
trial, but handles all other cases in a fair way, a flawed rule of law or an
efficient rule by law?
108. If this approach is adopted, then arguably one would also need to address similar is-
sues with respect to the other end of the spectrum. That is, one would need to specify the
optimal degree (and, where applicable, the form or type) of transparency, clarity, stability,
consistency, and so on for realization of the rule of law ideal. Additionally, such a methodol-
ogy would require priority rules for dealing with conflicts where improvements with respect to
one element-for example, clarity-will have an adverse affect on one or more other ele-
ments, such as stability. Given the difficulty of considering all of the conceivable context-
specific factors that could influence such choices, whether it would be possible-and if possi-
ble, of much practical use-to construct such a detailed formal theory is highly doubtful.
In my view, the elements of a thin theory are sufficiently specified for the present purpose
of determining the direction of China's legal reforms and providing a workable standard for
measuring the progress of such reforms. More generally, rather than attempting to further hone
the elements into a fully developed ideal thin theory, a more useful approach would be to
consider specific cases as they arise in the context of a particular legal system in order to de-
termine whether more clarity or consistency is desirable or the gap between law and practice
should be narrowed. Ultimately, my approach is pragmatic: to the extent that a thin rule of law
is a useful way of understanding some of the obstacles faced by citizens, investors, or legal
reformers in China, or can be used as a metric for cross-cultural comparisons or for analyzing
political or economic phenomena, then use it. There is no need to wait for a fully developed
thin or thick theory of the rule of law. For the criticism that the rule of law paradigm may
hinder more than assist in understanding legal reforms in China, see Donald Clarke, Alterna-
tive Approaches to Chinese Law: Beyond the "Rule of Law" Paradigm, in WASEDA
PROCEEDINGS OF COMPARATIVE LAW: OPEN LECTURE MEETINGS, APRIL 1999-DECEMBER
1999 & SYMPOSIUMS, OCTOBER 1998-DECEMBER 1999, at 2, 145 (1998-1999).
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There are considerable theoretical and practical difficulties to this
approach. For instance, China's legal system suffers from a number of
shortcomings, many of them institutional in nature.' As a result, the
system falls considerably short of the ideal in terms of such basic re-
quirements as consistency and stability of laws, a reasonably narrow gap
between law on the books and law in practice, and the fair application of
laws. On the other hand, there has been marked improvement within all
of these dimensions. There seems no non-arbitrary way of deciding
whether the system should be described as an imperfect rule of law or
simply not rule of law at all. Take the requirement of "consistency" as an
example. Let us assume that we could show that twenty percent of all
local regulations were inconsistent with central laws. Would that be suf-
ficient to disqualify the system from being considered as a rule of law,
albeit an imperfect one? What if forty percent or sixty percent or eighty
percent of such regulations were inconsistent? Would it matter whether
the trend was toward less inconsistency, say if in the past eighty percent
of regulations were -inconsistent, but now "only" fifty percent were?
Would it matter if steps were being taken to reduce the level of inconsis-
tency, as is indeed the case in China? Would the reasons for the high
level of inconsistencies matter? During times of economic transition,
higher levels are to be expected. Does that somehow make the high level
of inconsistencies less objectionable than turf-fighting between adminis-
trative agencies or the lack of effective institutions for overturning
inconsistent local regulations?
Of perhaps even greater concern is the still limited, albeit increasing,
ability of the legal system to impose meaningful limits on government
actors. Administrative officials enjoy considerable discretion. "° To be
sure, administrative officials everywhere enjoy considerable discretion,
and there are good reasons why administrative officials in China should
have somewhat greater discretion than officials in countries where the
legislature is more developed and the economy is more stable. Even as-
suming PRC officials should be granted a high degree of discretion,
however, such discretion must be subject to legal limits to comply with
the requirements of rule of law. Unfortunately, the mechanisms for
checking administrative discretion-the letter and petition system, su-
pervision by the media and the Party, administrative reconsideration,
administrative supervision, and administrative litigation-remain weak.
Nevertheless, the very fact that such mechanisms have been established
109. See LUBMAN, supra note 69; William Alford, A Second Great Wall? China's Post-
Cultural Revolution Project of Legal Construction, 11 CULTURAL DYNAMICS 193 (1999);
Peerenboom, supra note 18.
110. See Peerenboom, supra note 46.
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represents a major step toward realization of rule of law and away from
rule by law. Moreover, although the mechanisms are weak, they are not
completely ineffectual. After all, plaintiffs do prevail in administrative
litigation in some forty percent of the cases, a rate higher than in the
United States, Taiwan, or Japan."
Despite the high success rate, the PRC judiciary at present clearly
lacks sufficient independence and authority to hold the highest level sen-
ior government officials accountable, at least without the support of the
Party."2 Is the limited accountability of senior officials in practice suffi-
cient to deny China's legal system the label of rule of law? After all,
even in the United States, senior government officials are frequently not
held accountable for their actions. Despite the rhetoric of equality of all
before the law, in reality senior government officials often receive spe-
cial treatment in many countries. One need only consider Gerald Ford's
pardoning of Richard Nixon or Bill Clinton's pardoning of former Hous-
ing Secretary Henry Cisneros and congressman Daniel Rostenkowski.
Indeed, the light slap on the wrist Clinton received for lying under
oath-suspension of his license to practice law for five years and a fine
of $25,000-smacks of special privilege." 13
Hilary Josephs concluded in her comparison of legal accountability
for corruption in China and the United States that they "are quite alike in
their general reluctance to prosecute high officials. Despite fundamental
differences in political systems, and a common commitment to equality
before the law, those in power ar6 rarely called to task in either country
for criminal misconduct associated with discharge of their official du-
I 11. In 1995, there were 51,370 administrative suits, with the decision of the administra-
tive unit being modified or quashed 15% of the time. In addition, the plaintiff withdrew suit in
approximately 23% of the cases when the administrative unit changed its decision prior to
judgment. 1997 CHINA LAW Y.B. (Publ'g House of Law, Beijing) 48. Despite the increase in
total number of administrative suits to over 90,000 in 1997, the success rate was virtually
unchanged, with 15% of the decisions quashed or modified and 25% ending in withdrawal
after the agency agreed to change its decision. 1998 CHINA LAW Y.B. (Publ'g House of Law,
Beijing) 134. In contrast, the success rate is 12% in the United States and 8% in Japan and
Taiwan. Of course, by themselves, such numbers are hard to interpret. It is possible that the
success rate should be even higher in China because administrative officials act illegally more
often than elsewhere. For the U.S. figure, see Peter Schuck & E. Donald Elliot, To the Chevron
Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984 (1990) (cit-
ing figures for 1985). For Japan and Taiwan, see KATHARINA PISTOR & PHILIP A. WELLONS,
THE ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIAN EcONOMic DEVELOPMENT 1960-
1995, at 254, 257 (1999).
112. Most CCP members who are disciplined internally or punished by the courts tend to
be low level officials. For instance, in 1998, courts handled 18,468 cases of economic crime
and convicted 15,670 offenders. However, there were only 3 officials at the ministerial level,
54 officials at the prefecture or department level, and 434 at the county or division level. See
Supreme People's Court Work Report, FBIS doc. FrS19990323000320 (Zuigao Renmin Fa-
yuan Gongbao, Mar. 20, 1999).
113. Mr Clinton's Last Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2001, at A22.
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ties.""4 She also points out that in both countries, prosecutors' decisions
are influenced by political factors, including party affiliations, with a
greater readiness to target someone from the opposing political party or
faction. Needless to say, China and the United States are not on all fours
in this regard. In some ways, China takes corruption more seriously in
that corrupt government officials are more likely to be prosecuted based
on the core offense rather than ancillary crimes such as fraud or tax eva-
sion, and serious offenses carry the death penalty, whereas in the United
States the worst punishment is a definite term of imprisonment. 115
To be sure, it is hard to imagine Jiang Zemin being asked to testify
under oath in regard to alleged sexual harassment, as in the case of
President Clinton. ' 6 Nor is it likely that Jiang could be impeached, or
convicted of crimes and sentenced to jail once he leaves office, as with
former South Korean Presidents Chun and Roh."7 But should that be the
minimum standard?"' Given that China has implemented laws and estab-
lished legal institutions capable of imposing limits on some government
officials, the inability to hold a small core of senior-most leaders ac-
countable in all instances arguably demonstrates only that rule of law is
weak in China, not completely absent.
Similarly, all legal systems are politicized to some extent. Moreover,
the degree and nature of politicization may differ depending on the type
114. Hilary Josephs, The Upright and the Low-down: An Examination of Official Cor-
ruption in the United States and the People's Republic of China, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. &
COM. 271 (2000).
115. Id. at 272-74.
116. Clinton was forced to testify as part of Paula Jones's civil damages case when the
U.S. Supreme Court rejected his arguments that the civil case would be unduly disruptive and
should be stayed until he left office. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
117. Chun and Roh were sentenced to death and 22 years imprisonment, respectively, on
charges of corruption, treason, and mutiny during the military era. President Kim Young Sam
reduced both sentences, and as president-elect, Kim Dae Jung pardoned both men as a good-
will gesture toward political conservatives. Andrew Pollack, New Korean Leader Agrees to
Pardon of 2 Ex-Dictators, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1997, sec. 1, at 10.
118. The principle of equality for all, the public's demand for justice, and the legitimacy
of the government all support holding senior officials accountable. Holding even former heads
of State responsible for their prior actions may also signal a successor regime's commitment
to rule of law and its intent to distance itself from the previous regime. On the other hand,
there are good reasons in some cases for not prosecuting senior officials or to pardon them for
criminal acts. Impeachment of the president, for example, might lead to a constitutional crisis
or destabilize a shaky government. Furthermore, the decision to prosecute may itself be politi-
cized, and result in prolonged social confrontation. The citizenry's sense of national pride may
be injured when senior leaders are publicly paraded before the eyes of the world. Pardons may
also be justified on the ground that the public humiliation of being removed from office or
having one's transgressions broadcast on the nightly news is sufficient punishment for way-
ward officials. Nevertheless, the question remains, setting aside such worries and assuming
that in some cases the current or former head of State should be held accountable: Is the in-
ability of the legal system to hold such heads of State accountable sufficient to deny the legal
system rule of law status (and to describe it as rule by law)?
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of rule of law that prevails. Nevertheless, the PRC legal system is
undeniably and unusually politicized, and clearly differs both in the
degree and manner of politicization from other legal systems,
particularly liberal democracies, known for rule of law. Although the
Party and individual Party members are legally obligated to follow the
law, the Party's role is not clearly defined in law. Implementation of even
a Statist Socialist rule of law would require that the Party's role be
spelled out more clearly in law. For instance, while political parties in
other countries may play a role in appointing judges, that role is
prescribed by law, whereas the role of the Party in appointing judges is
not set forth in any publicly promulgated State law. Nor is the role of
Party organs within the court or the role of the Political-Legal
Committee (PLC) prescribed by law."9 Even assuming the role of Party
organs was spelled out in law, the degree and manner of influence of
such organs over the work of the judiciary that would be consistent with
rule of law would still be an issue. There have been some efforts to
separate Party and State with :respect to judicial matters. Party organs
rarely interfere directly in the courts' handling of specific cases. 20 Yet
dissidents are regularly denied a procedurally fair trial.'
2
'
119. The Political-Legal Committee (PLC) is one department within the Party organiza-
tion; thus there is a PLC at each level, with the PLC answering to the Party Committee at the
same level and the PLC at the next highest level. The PLC is primarily responsible for ideo-
logical work through setting and disseminating policy, though it is also involved in the
decision-making process for certain important or difficult cases, and occasionally for
personnel decisions.
120. According to a survey of 280 judges published in 1993, almost 70% of the judges
claimed that as a rule they were subject to outside interference, citing the following sources:
CCP, 8%; government organs, 26%; social networks, 29%; other, 4%. See IDEAL AND REAL-
ITY OF RULE OF LAW, supra note 84, at 33. Another survey of 100 intermediate and basic level
court judges in Chongqing asked: "when you handle compulsory enforcement, what kind of
interference do you regularly experience?" Forty-five percent responded no interference; 12%,
CCP interference; 32%, government department interference; 15%, interference from the
people's congress; 12%, interference from within the court; I1%, outside interference from
non-parties; and 6%, other interference. See ZHONGGUO XINGZHENG FAZHI FAZHAN
JINCHENG DIAOCHA BAOGAO [SURVEY REPORT ON THE DEVELOPMENT AND PROGRESS OF
CHINA'S ADMINISTRATIVE RULE OF LAW] 63 (Jiang Mingan ed., 1998). In a survey of arbitral
award enforcement in China, I found that while interference from local government officials
was common, CCP interference was rare and usually only occurred when there was a personal
connection between a Party member and the respondent against whom enforcement was being
sought. Randall Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts: An Empirical Study of Enforcement of
Arbitral Awards in the PRC, 49 Am. J. COMP. L. 249 (2001). Of course, it is often difficult to
draw a clear line between the Party and State, as government officials generally wear two hats.
However, the primary allegiance of government officials may in some cases be to their gov-
ernment post rather than to the Party. See SHIPING ZHENG, PARTY VS. STATE IN PosT-1949
CHINA (1997).
121. U.S. Dep't of State, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices Released by
the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (Feb. 25, 2000), at http://
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Whether politically sensitive cases are handled according to law and
even dissidents are afforded a fair trial would seem to be one useful ba-
rometer of whether a legal system meets the requirements of rule of law.
Because politically sensitive cases challenge the ruling regime most di-
rectly, a legal system capable of handling such cases fairly and in a
manner consistent with the requirements of a thin rule of law will most
likely handle commercial, criminal, and other less controversial cases in
a similar way. Yet it is possible that a legal system could be rule of law
compliant in some respects (with respect to commercial law) and not
compliant in other ways (with respect to political cases). Indeed this ar-
guably has been the case at some points in Taiwan, South Korea,
Singapore, and other Asian countries. 22 Granted, in the long run, such a
system is not likely to be sustainable because for a system to comply
with the standards of a thin rule of law in the commercial area requires
significant institutional development and autonomy. Once institutions
gain a certain degree of autonomy and authority and those within the
institution achieve a level of professionalism, the institutional actors are
likely to pursue further changes to increase their autonomy and authority.
As a result, there are likely to be spillover effects from one area of law to
another as institutions develop. Again, Taiwan, South Korea, and more
recently Indonesia are examples of this trend. 23 During the transition
www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights/1999-hrp-report/china.html (last visited May 6,
2002).
122. Of the Asian countries that have experienced sustained growth, most have enjoyed
legal systems that comply with the standards of a thin rule of law, at least with respect to
commercial matters. Although the political regimes may not have been democratic and the
legal system may not have provided much protection for civil and political rights in some
cases, the Asian countries that experienced economic growth generally scored high with re-
spect to the legal protection of economic interests. A survey of economic freedoms in 102
countries between 1993 and 1995 found that 7 of the top 20 countries were in Asia. Economic
freedoms include protection of the value of money, free exchange of property, a fair judiciary,
few trade restrictions, labor market freedoms, and freedom from economic coercion by politi-
cal opponents. BEHIND EAST ASIAN GROWTH: THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF
PROPERTY 7 (Henry S. Rowen ed., 1998). For the argument that law played a greater role than
normally suggested, see PISTOR & WELLONS, supra note 111; MARK RAMSEYER & MINORO
NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH (1999); SAMANTHA RAVICH, MAR-
KETIZATION AND DEMOCRACY: EAST ASIAN EXPERIENCES (2000).
123. See Sean Cooney, A Community Changes: Taiwan's Council of Grand Justices and
Liberal Democratic Reform, in LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA, supra note 5 (noting
the Council of Grand Justices assumed a much greater role in curbing administrative
discretion and limiting government as legal and political reforms progressed, thereby
contributing to further reforms); see also Tsung-fu Chen, The Rule of Law in Taiwan, in THE
RULE OF LAW: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE PACIFIC RIM, supra note 6 (observing that the
Council has become more aggressive in protecting human rights by relying on broad
constitutional clauses such as due process to promote freedom of speech and the press and to
strike down criminal law statutes, and by relying on practices similar in many respects to
current PRC statutes and procedures); Hong, supra note 7 (noting that the rising demand for
rule of law among the citizenry who had come to believe in the ideology of rule of law put
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period, some will choose to describe the legal system as a developing,
albeit flawed, rule of law. Others, particularly Liberal Democrats who
privilege civil and political rights over other rights, will be more likely to
deny the system the label rule of law.
It should be noted, however, that a "fair" trial in politically sensitive
cases need not mean that dissidents or political activists will win. In fact,
even in the United States political activists regularly lost free speech
cases well into this century under a variety of restrictive laws from the
Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 to the Espionage Act of 1917 to state
laws criminalizing "subversive advocacy.' 24 Likewise, slaves challenging
slavery laws and people of color protesting various forms of racial dis-
crimination have all too often met with defeat in U.S. courts. Yet despite
such outcomes, many would describe the U.S. legal system at such times
as rule of law. As noted, a thin rule of law does not ensure just outcomes.
Thus, while the struggle to obtain a procedurally fair trial consistent with
a thin rule of law may represent a significant achievement in some re-
spects, at times it may seem a hollow victory to those sent to jail under
repressive laws.
To sum up the discussion so far, the problem of defining precisely
when a legal system meets the minimum threshold of rule of law, despite
its shortcomings, and when the shortcomings are so extensive or objec-
tionable to deny the system the title of rule of law, is a generic
jurisprudential problem not unique to China. Clearly, reasonable people
can, do, and will disagree over the degree and type of shortcomings that
will be sufficient to deprive a legal system of the exalted status of rule of
law. Given the wide variation in legal systems and the many ways in
which all legal systems fall short of the ideal of rule of law, attempting to
articulate more precisely the standards of a thin theory or trying to state
in a formal way the degree or kind of deviance from the ideal sufficient
to deprive a legal system of the label rule of law is not likely to result in
pressure on the government to continue reforms); K. Yang, Judicial Review and Social Change
in the Korean Democratizing Process, 41 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1993) (noting South Korean
courts became more aggressive as legal and political reforms progressed, thus supporting and
promoting further reforms).
In Indonesia, the Suharto government's desire to obtain legitimacy abroad and to deal
with corruption and patrimonial practices that were adversely affecting business confidence
led to the establishment of administrative courts. Those courts, however, turned on Suharto,
pursuing key allies on corruption charges and defiantly striking down the government's deci-
sion to ban a popular weekly news magazine. In response to a groundswell of public support,
the judiciary became increasingly aggressive in challenging the government, to the point
where Suharto himself was brought up on charges of corruption. See David Bourchier, Be-
tween Law and Politics: The Malaysian Judiciary Since Independence, in LAW, CAPITALISM
AND POWER IN ASIA, supra note 5, at 240-41.
124. See David Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514
(1981).
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sufficient consensus to put an end to the general debate. The best that
can be hoped for is a rather rough consensus based on the facts in a par-
ticular case. As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter said about
pornography, "I know it when I see it'" 25 To be sure, one person's por-
nography is another person's art. As the ongoing debates over what is
and what is not pornography demonstrate, the eyeball test allows for
considerable personal bias. Liberal Democrats will inevitably weight
more heavily certain deficiencies in China's legal system, such as the
unfair treatment of dissidents and the system of reeducation through la-
bor. Thus, the eyeball approach will not always lead to agreement.
Nevertheless, in some cases, there will be a general consensus. For in-
stance, few if any would challenge the claim that China's legal system
during the Mao period was not rule of law.1
26
Given the difficulties associated with the first approach, an alterna-
tive approach would be to describe any system as rule of law in which
there is a credible normative commitment to the principle that law is to
bind the State and State actors, as evidenced by efforts to establish a le-
gal system that meets the standard of a thin theory. Although in some
cases there might still be disagreement about whether even such a mini-
mal standard has been met, lowering the standard would shift the debate
in most cases from whether a legal system ought to be described in terms
of rule of law to how well rule of law is implemented in practice. Having
cleared the initial hurdle of a credible commitment to the principle that
law ought to bind the State and State actors, the focus then turns to the
extent to which the ideal of rule of law is actually realized, with legal
systems ranked on a sliding scale based on the criteria of a thin theory,
including the extent to which law does limit the State and State actors.
Such an approach is arguably more consistent with the reality that all
legal systems deviate from the ideal in various ways and to various de-
grees. Taking this tack, China's legal system, for instance, could be
considered as a rule of law, albeit an imperfect one. Whereas the legal
systems of Japan and Germany, for example, might merit a ranking of
nine on a ten-point scale, China's legal system might only be assigned a
score of two.1
27
125. "[C]riminal laws in this area are constitutionally limited to hard-core pornography. I
shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced
with that shorthand description ... but I know it when I see it." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
126. As Goldstein concludes, the answer to the question "do we know the rule of law
when we see it?" is: sometimes. Goldstein, supra note 14.
127. To rank a legal system there must be rules for assigning points to positive and nega-
tive features. There is likely to be some disagreement about how to interpret a statistic such as
a 50% inconsistency rate in China, particularly given other factors such as the reasons for such
a high level of inconsistency. Similarly, how much weight should be assigned to the inability
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This sliding scale approach is, however, not without problems. An
initial difficulty, though not an insurmountable one in my view, is in es-
tablishing the minimum requirements to show a "credible normative
commitment" to the principle that law binds the State and State actors.
For instance, in China's case, the principle that the Party, individual
Party members, State organs, and government officials must comply
with the law was set forth in Article 5 of the 1982 Constitution. By itself,
however, that would not be sufficient, particularly given the previous role
of law and constitutions during the Mao era. At the time, few observers
would have believed solely on the basis of a change in the Constitution
that the Party had accepted any meaningful limits on its power. Observ-
ers could reasonably have expected the ruling regime to produce more
evidence of its change in policy, and in particular to back up its rhetoric
with actions.
Since then, however, the ruling regime has taken concrete steps to
create a legal basis for challenging the State by passing a wide range of
administrative laws and carrying out a host of reforms to strengthen legal
institutions.'28 The dominant understanding of the purpose of administra-
tive law has also shifted from simply a focus on government efficiency
and the use of administrative law to ensure that government officials
serve the interest of the State to the now widely accepted "balance the-
ory" whereby administrative law both protects individual rights and
enhances government efficiency." 9
The ruling regime reconfirmed its commitment to rule of law by
amending the Constitution in 1999. In addition, the State has expended
considerable resources building up all of the legal institutions.30 The leg-
islature is more assertive;' 3 ' the courts enjoy greater independence;' the
legal profession is more autonomous and professional;'3 3 the procuracy
and police forces have also been strengthened. The Party has turned over
much of the responsibility for daily governance to the usual State or-
of the legal system to hold senior officials accountable? Again, whether there is much point in
trying to work out a detailed metric is highly doubtful. The best that can be expected are some
rough rules of thumb. A more practical approach is to create a rule of law index by selecting a
limited number of variables, and then to have observers familiar with the legal system assign a
rank within a relatively narrow range. Such a method is employed, for example, by the Inter-
national Country Risk Guide-which uses a scale of 0 to 6 to measure business risk arising
from shortcomings in the legal system. Adapting this approach to present purposes, countries
could be ranked on a scale of I to 10 based on how well they comply with the requirements of
a thin theory.
128. See Peerenboom, supra note 46.
129. See, e.g., BALANCE THEORY OF MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 98.
130. LuBMAN, supra note 69; Alford, supra note 109.
131. TANNER, supra note 82; Dowdle, supra note 82.
132. PEERENBOOM, supra note 37, ch. VII.
133. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 85.
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gans. 3M The Party no longer rules primarily based on Party policy and
Party dictates.'35 With the greater reliance on law to govern, law has be-
gun to gain normative authority and is becoming an independent source
of legitimation independent of tradition or the charisma of revolutionary
Party leaders whose views in the past provided the authority for policies
and laws.'36
Many skeptics still question whether the ruling regime accepts the
principle that law binds the State and State actors. Many commentators
still characterize the legal system as an instrumental rule by law.'37 Some
suggest that many of the reforms are actually consistent with a more ef-
ficient rule by law, especially a softer authoritarian version than that of
the Mao era.'38 When vital interests of the Party are at stake, as in politi-
cally sensitive cases involving democracy dissidents or Falungong
adherents, the interests of the Party prevail over legal niceties such as the
procedural rights of the accused.
134. PEERENBOOM, supra note 37, ch. V.
135. LUBMAN, supra note 69; Jones & Finder, supra note 80.
136. Dowdle, supra note 82; cf Edward Epstein, Law and Legitimation in Post-Mao
China, in DOMESTIC LAW REFORMS IN POST-MAO CHINA (Pitman Potter ed., 1994).
137. See, e.g., Chen Jianfu, Market Economy and the Internationalisation of Civil and
Commercial Law in the People's Republic of China, in LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA,
supra note 5 (suggesting that legal reforms are not meant to change the nature of law as a tool,
but simply make law a better tool); see also Pitman B. Potter, The Chinese Legal System:
Continuing Commitment to the Primacy of State Power, 159 CHINA Q. 672, 674, 683 (1999)
(describing the system as "rule through law" and concluding that rule of law, in the sense of
the State being just another actor, remains a distant prospect); Stanley Lubman, Bird in a
Cage: Chinese Law Reform After Twenty Years, 20 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 385, 423 (2000)
(allowing that "China is in transition"). However, Lubman does not say in a transition from
what to what. Presumably it is not from rule by law to rule of law. Though he accepts that law
plays a more important role than in the past and that there has been considerable progress in
institution building, and even acknowledges certain "fragile harbingers" of a possible rule of
law future for China, he denies that China even has a legal system because of the incoherence
he perceives in current institutions. LUBMAN, supra note 69. He also highlights the instrumen-
tal aspects of PRC law and the primacy of policy; claims that there is an "inescapable
contradiction between the avowed goal of attaining rule of law and the ideological limits" of
the ruling regime; suggests that the Party's emphasis on stability is shorthand for Party con-
trol; sides with those who see the development of the NPC not in terms of an evolution to rule
of law, but as serving the purpose of a heavily instrumental law; and, as a result, remains cau-
tiously pessimistic about the future of legality in China. Id. Although Lubman does not
characterize his own position in terms of rule by law, in my view, an instrumental law in
which law is a tool for the Party and is not meant to impose meaningful limits on the CCP
because there remains a deep contradiction between rule of law and the leading role of the
Party is still (i) a rule by law and (ii) not consistent with any fundamental change, and in par-
ticular a shift toward rule of law.
Law is used instrumentally in every legal system. Thus, a distinction must be made be-
tween pernicious instrumentalism and acceptable instrumentalism. Legal systems in which the
law is only a tool of the State are best described as rule by law, whereas legal systems in which
the law (at least in theory) imposes meaningful limits on State actors may merit the label rule
of law.
138. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 137.
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Yet there are good reasons to question the skeptics' view.
Undeniably, some of the recent reforms and, developments, such as a
certain amount of institution building, greater reliance on law rather than
policy, and even some devolution of power, are consistent with the view
that the purpose of legal reforms is a more efficient rule by law.
However, they are also consistent with a transition to rule of law. As is
often the case, much turns on which side bears the burden of proof. Rule
by law advocates insist that those who see a transition toward rule of law
provide conclusive proof of the transition. Turning the tables, however,
why assume the skeptics' view is correct? Rule by law advocates cannot
show conclusively that reforms consistent with both a transition to rule
of law and a more efficient rule by law are actually meant to support a
more efficient rule by law any more than others can show conclusively
they are meant to support rule of law.
That said, while some of the reforms are consistent with a ruling re-
gime bent on creating a more efficient rule by law, they are not necessary
for such a system. For instance, it is not clear why the ruling regime
would have had to allow for private law firms to create a more efficient
rule by law. Moreover, the nature and extent of institution building and
the degree of devolution of authority call into question the view that the
purpose of such reforms is simply to create a more efficient rule by law.
In some cases, reforms have been driven not by central authorities but by
other actors within the system, who have pushed reforms in directions
not anticipated by the central authorities and taken reforms beyond what
was originally intended by the central leaders."39
Different groups and individuals are likely to support reforms for
different reasons. The skeptical view tends to emphasize the purpose of
central Party leaders in supporting or tolerating legal reforms, rather than
the motives of other segments of the polity in backing reforms.'4 Yet
139. For instance, much of the regulatory framework for business has been developed on
an incremental basis in response to grass-roots initiatives. To meet the demands of investors,
local governments regularly have forged ahead in carrying out commercial law reforms with-
out central approval. Among countless examples, local governments approved the
establishment of wholly-foreign owned enterprises and holding companies and allowed inves-
tors to mortgage their assets years before the central government passed laws sanctioning such
activities. Similarly, by the time the Lawyers Law was passed in 1996, authorizing the estab-
lishment of partnership law firms, local justice bureaus had already approved hundreds of such
firms. In recent years, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) established a network of hotlines in re-
sponse to complaints from frustrated citizens about negligent lawyers and from equally
frustrated lawyers that government officials were preventing them from carrying out their
duties. For the bottom-up institutional development of the NPC, see Michael Dowdle, The
NPC as Catalyst for New Norns of Public Political Participation in China, in CHANGING
VIEWS OF CITIZENSHIP IN CHINA (Merle Goldman & Elizabeth Perry eds., 2001).
140. The most common explanation for China's troubles places the brunt of the blame
on ideology and the attitudes of China's ruling elite, particularly senior Party leaders. Analyses
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many government officials, academics, and citizens no doubt support
legal reforms because they believe such reforms will limit government
arbitrariness and lead to better protection of individuals' rights and inter-
ests.
While skeptics can explain away some reforms as consistent with a
more efficient rule by law, other reforms cannot be dismissed so readily.
The express commitment to rule of law and the efforts to establish a vi-
able administrative law system that aims to both protect individual rights
and enhance government efficiency, for instance, are at odds with the
establishment of a more efficient rule by law.
Setting a high standard for showing a credible commitment to the
principle that law ought to bind the State and State actors (and hence is
not rule by law) runs into similar problems confronted in the first ap-
proach. Are such failures evidence of lack of normative commitment to
rule of law principles or simply evidence of a weak rule of law? Taken to
the extreme, diehard skeptics will be satisfied with nothing less than the
full realization of the rule of law ideal, or at least a legal system that sub-
stantially complies with their own values and biases as to what is
important. Thus, some skeptics may not be satisfied until current or for-
mer leaders are held accountable and political dissidents win their free
speech cases. Only then will they be convinced that there is a credible
commitment to the principle that the law binds the State and State actors.
Yet requiring such actions as conclusive proof of a credible commitment
to rule of law demonstrates the shortcomings of this approach.
The establishment of rule of law is a long term process. No legal
system can transform itself from rule by law into a fully implemented
rule of law overnight. All countries now known for rule of law initially
went through a period in which legal institutions were weak and rule of
of China's failures to realize rule of law thus typically begin, and all too often end, by noting
that China remains a single party socialist State. See, e.g., Leslie Palmer, Conclusion: Condi-
tions for Rule of Law, in STATE AND LAW IN EASTERN ASIA 141 (Leslie Palmer ed., 1996)
(declaring that "it is certainly not possible to speak of the rule of law, and not even of the rule
by law. It is clear.., that the country's rulers, namely the Communist Party, regard such rules
as simply Western 'bourgeois' conventions which limit their freedom of action; arbitrary gov-
emnment, which recognizes no restraint, is usual")
While Lubman portrays rule of law as incompatible with current Party ideology, he does
note that there are many other obstacles to rule of law besides Party ideology. LUBMAN, supra
note 69. Like Lubman, both Peter Come and William Alford observe that there are many ob-
stacles to the realization of rule of law besides the Party. However, they appear to claim that a
hostile view toward rule of law among the leaders is sufficient to prevent its realization. Alter-
natively, their claim may be the weaker one that the intent of the leaders is an important factor
in determining whether rule of law will be realized in China. If so, then the difference between
us may simply come down to a matter of degree as to how important such views are, since I
believe the views of leaders are relevant, but not determinative. See PETER CORNE, FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN CHINA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL SYSTEM (1996); Alford, supra note 109,
at 193, 198.
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law was imperfectly implemented. Although it may be impossible to
pinpoint the exact moment the tide turned toward rule of law, at some
point preceding the actual implementation of some reasonable approxi-
mation of the ideal of rule of law, there was inevitably a credible
commitment to it. Similarly, in China, there will necessarily have been a
credible commitment to rule of law long before the day when senior
State leaders are held accountable and the courts decide dissident cases
impartially, at which point even the most cynical skeptic will finally be
willing to acknowledge that China is committed to (and indeed enjoys)
rule of law. If and when that day arrives, it will be clear in retrospect that
the skeptics' view during the transition period that the purpose of re-
forms was to create a more efficient rule by law will have been incorrect.
Alternatively, rule by law skeptics might define rule by law in terms
of a much higher standard of actual performance of the legal system
rather than the minimal standard of whether a credible commitment has
been made to the principle that law binds the State and State actors. Yet
anyone who defines rule by law in terms of a higher performance stan-
dard must define the point at which the system no longer counts as rule
by law. As we have seen, it is difficult if not impossible to define the
minimal conditions for rule of law with any precision.
More importantly, the distinction between rule by law and rule of
law seems to be a conceptual one rather than an empirical one. A system
in which law is only meant to serve as a tool of the ruling regime without
binding government officials is rule by law. It seems counter-intuitive to
argue that a system in which law is meant to be supreme but which falls
short of that ideal in practice is for that reason rule by law.
Focusing on the conceptual distinction in the purpose of law rather
than the extent to which law actually imposes meaningful limits on State
actors provides a fairly bright line test for distinguishing between rule of
law and rule by law. The legal systems of Imperial and Mao China,
where law was conceived of as just a tool to achieve the interests of the
State and was not meant to limit the ruler or Party, are best described as
rule by law. In contrast, the change in the official rhetoric to a conception
of law, where law is to be supreme, represents a major departure from
the Imperial and Mao eras. Defining rule by law in terms of the extent to
which the legal system actually imposes meaningful limits on State ac-
tors tends to lump the current system together with the legal systems of
the Imperial and Mao eras, despite their significant differences.
While it may no longer be accurate to describe China's legal system
as rule by law, whether the system merits the label rule of law is another
matter. Perhaps the biggest objection to the low-threshold, sliding-scale
approach is that rule of law is an honorific term used to praise or criti-
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cize a legal system. Thus, rule of law in ordinary usage implies a certain
degree of achievement. Accordingly, many people would object to call-
ing a legal system that scored a one or two on a ten-point thin-rule-of-
law scale a rule of law, just as many object to referring to China's legal
system in terms of rule of law, even though it would seem to rank at least
a two on such a scale.
In light of the many shortcomings of the legal system and the ordi-
nary use of rule of law as an honorific term signaling a certain standard
of achievement, I describe China's legal system as in transition toward
rule of law but still falling short of the minimal standard of achievement
required to be considered rule of law.'4 ' Problems such as the treatment
of political dissidents and the inability of the legal system to hold senior-
most officials accountable would certainly give me pause in describing
China's system as even an imperfect rule of law. As troubling, if not more
so from a rule of law perspective, however, are the many technical prob-
lems that arise in daily practice that have nothing to do with politically
sensitive issues. The cumulative toll of these everyday deficiencies, in my
view, is sufficient to deny China's current system the title of rule of law,
even allowing that there is sufficient evidence of a credible normative
commitment to the principle that law is to bind the State and State actors
to render the characterization of the legal system as rule by law inappo-
site.
Suffice it to say that while what constitutes the minimal standard of
achievement for rule of law as a general matter is subject to debate, just
as in some cases most people of whatever political persuasion will be
able to agree that a particular object is pornographic, most commentators
both within China and abroad readily acknowledge that the legal system
falls well short of the minimal standard implied by the honorific label
rule of law. 42 Given the general consensus, there is no need at present to
delve more deeply into the minimal conditions for rule of law. In the fi-
nal analysis, little is to be gained by engaging in an endless debate about
which of the above approaches is more warranted. To some extent, the
approach one adopts will depend on one's purpose. Clearly, there is a
rhetorical difference in claiming that China lacks rule of law or, con-
versely, that China's legal system is a weak rule of law. Government
officials may prefer to argue that China has rule of law, albeit a weak
141. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 37.
142. As noted, many people conflate rule of law with Liberal Democratic rule of law.
Foreign commentators in particular often fail to appreciate the significant progress China has
made in improving the legal system in a short time. Nevertheless, even when measured against
the more technical standards of a thin theory, China's legal system still falls far short, not just
of some unobtainable ideal, but of reasonable expectations for how a system can and should
operate.
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one, to emphasize the difference between the current regime and previ-
ous regimes. Critics who wish to condemn China for the harsh treatment
of dissidents will prefer to characterize China as lacking rule of law or as
implementing a more efficient rule by law. Yet substantively, those on all
sides of these debates acknowledge both progress and problems. Many
are also likely to share the same goal that China's legal system more
fully implement rule of law. Accordingly, those who favor the sliding-
scale approach can simply take my comments that China currently lacks
rule of law or is in transition toward rule of law to mean that China is in
the process of more fully implementing rule of law.
B. Imposition of a Western Ideal? The Lack of
Viable Alternatives to Rule of Law
Still another approach would be to argue that because China-is so
different from other countries, it is likely to develop its own long term,
stable alternative to rule of law-a different kind of legal system that
does not comply with the requirements of a thin theory. According to this
view, my focus on rule of law is simply wrong-headed. Despite my ef-
forts to escape imposing "Western" categories, I have still ended up
doing just that by assuming that China must develop a legal system that
meets the requirements of a thin theory.
Donald Clarke, for instance, raises a number of concerns about the
"imperfect realization of an ideal" or "IRI" approach to comparative law,
an approach that shares certain similarities with my approach, although
there are also important differences. 43 According to Clarke, under this
"essentially teleological approach," the Chinese legal system is identified
and measured in terms of an ideal end state chosen by the analyst.'" He
notes that the IRI approach could work with any end state, but "in fact it
is always invariably used in conjunction with an end state posited as the
Western rule of law ideal. This rule of law ideal constitutes the para-
digm, in the Kuhnian sense, that governs the entire enterprise of
analyzing the Chinese legal system."'
45
Clarke argues that reliance on the paradigm of "the Western rule of
law ideal," or the Ideal Western Legal Order, has several theoretical and
practical drawbacks. First, it "dictates" the questions one asks, what one
considers to be relevant data, and how one interprets the phenomena ob-
served. In the na'fve version, China's legal system is simply compared to
143. Clarke, supra note 108, at 2.
144. Id. at 51.
145. Id. In a longer revised version of the article, Clarke refers to the Ideal Western Legal
Order rather than "the Western rule of law ideal." See Donald Clarke, Puzzling Observations
in Chinese Law: When Is a Riddle Just a Mistake? (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
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idealized portrayals of modern Western legal institutions, or even more
narrowly an idealized account of the U.S. system, and found wanting. In
the more sophisticated version, researchers overlook important aspects
of the Chinese legal system, misinterpret phenomena, and either attach
too much or too little importance to other phenomena. As a result, their
predictions as to how the legal system will develop are likely to be
wrong.
Clarke claims that practitioners of the IRI approach assume without
argumentation or support "that China has legal institutions" and that the
legal system is developing toward some form of rule of law:
In other words, the IRI approach assumes that we can talk mean-
ingfully about Chinese law and legal institutions; that China has
a set of institutions that can meaningfully be grouped together
under a single rubric, and that it is meaningful (i.e., it clarifies
more than it obscures) to label this rubric "legal"-the same
word we use to describe a set of institutions in our own society.
Thus, even to embark on the study of something called "Chinese
legal institutions" involves an a priori assumption that China has
a set of institutions largely similar to the institutions we call "le-
gal" in our society. If the institutions were not largely
congruent-if, for example, we were discussing churches or the
movie industry-we would not call the institutions "legal" in the
first place. More specifically, the very act of naming certain in-
stitutions involves drawing conclusions about them before the
investigation has even begun. If we call a certain institution a
"court," then we are claiming that this word conveys to the lis-
tener a more complete and accurate picture of the institution in
question than some other word. We could equally well call the
institution a "team," or an "office," or a "bureau"; the decision
not to use those words represents an implicit assertion about the
nature of the institution in question. The problem is that this as-
sertion precedes, rather than follows, inquiry into the nature of
the institution.
The second assumption is that these institutions are
"developing." Academic articles adopting this approach are
typically entitled "China's Developing Law of Contract" or
something similar. By "developing" is meant moving from a
more primitive and inferior stage to a more sophisticated and
better stage along a trajectory of linear progress toward a well-
understood end. The substantive content of this well-understood
end, as I have noted earlier, is typically the Western rule of law
ideal. In other words, the sophisticated IRI approach understands
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a particular institution now by seeing it as a nascent version of
an institution in the Western rule of law ideal. We identify its
imperfections in this way and we predict its future changes
(which we call "development" and not simply "change"). 4 6
Clarke is surely right to caution against an a priori assumption that
Chinese institutions are meant to serve the same purposes as those in
some Western liberal democracies. He is also surely correct to point out
that we are likely to misinterpret phenomena and go awry in our predic-
tions about China's development if we impose without questioning our
own modern U.S-based notion of how a legal system must function.
However, while China is distinctive in some respects, it increasingly con-
fronts similar challenges to those faced by other States with a market
economy and a more pluralistic populace. China has also already be-
come more entwined in a global economy and international legal order.
Not surprisingly, there has been considerable convergence in its legal
system, including with respect to the legislature, judiciary, and adminis-
trative agencies. No one would confuse these institutions with churches
or the movie industry, to use Clarke's examples, or even with the much
more politicized entities of the Mao era.
The applicability of a thin theory of rule of law is not therefore sim-
ply the unreflective a priori imposition of a Western ideal. In fact, is not
an imposition of a Western ideal at all due to widespread acceptance of,
and support for, a legal system that meets the requirements of a thin rule
of law in China?4 7 Given the convergence with respect to the purposes of
the legal system, legal rules, and the functions and practices of the vari-
ous institutions, one can reasonably describe China's institutions as legal
institutions. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how else to describe them.
To be sure, China's institutions are embedded in a very different context
from that of economically advanced Western liberal democracies. Thus,
there are likely to be some important differences in the institutions.
However, to deny that China's institutions are legal institutions simply
because they differ in some ways from institutions in some modem
Western liberal democracies is to assume that any institutions other than
ours are not legal institutions in the proper sense.' 48 At this point, it is
146. Clarke, supra note 108, at 52.
147. Further, at least in my case, the view that China is moving toward a thin rule of law
is based on an empirical assessment of how institutions have changed since the Mao era and
how they operate today, rather than on an a priori assumption of the inevitable applicability of
thin theories.
148. In the final analysis, as Clarke says, the ultimate standard for any definition, label,
or paradigm is whether it is useful: does it serve the purpose it was intended to serve (and is
that purpose itself useful)? In some cases, scholars may wish to stipulate a narrow definition
of law or legal system in order to bring out more sharply the contrasts between different
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unlikely that China will develop a legal system so radically different as
to render a thin rule of law conceptually inapplicable. China's distinct-
iveness is likely to be reflected in variations in thick theories compatible
with a thin theory, rather than in some credible, sustainable, normatively
acceptable, and feasible alternative to a thin theory.
One of the problems in heeding Clarke's warning about relying on
rule of law as a benchmark is that there is no other credible theory that
better describes the current system. For years the alternative has been to
describe China as an instrumental rule by law. That is problematic for all
of the reasons discussed previously. Whatever its descriptive inadequa-
cies, rule by law is even less useful as a normative goal for future
reforms. It should be noted that Clarke does not endorse rule by law as
an alternative description; nor does he, in the works cited, set out to pre-
sent a systematic alternative interpretation or theory to the rule of law
paradigm.
This is not to claim that Clarke or someone else could not come up
with a new theory that better describes the system than "the Western rule
of law ideal.' 49 In fact, if by the Western rule of law ideal one means
systems. This approach, however, may also lead the analyst to exaggerate the differences. For
example, the current system differs dramatically from the Mao era. No longer can the NPC be
described as a rubber stamp or the courts as just another bureaucracy with no more authority
than the post office. On the comparison of the courts to the post office, see Donald Clarke,
Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: The Enforcement of Civil Judgments, 10
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (1996).
149. Of course, not just any description will be an improvement. Ugo Mattei, for in-
stance, describes three types of legal systems. In a rule of professional law or rule of law
system, law is the primary mechanism for resolving disputes and the State is subject to law. In
contrast, in a rule of political law system, the separation between law and politics is absent or
minimal. Legal institutions are weak, and the law often does not bind government officials.
This form of law is characteristic of former socialist States in transition. A third category,
reflecting "the Oriental view of the law," is rule of traditional law. Mattei includes in this cate-
gory such disparate States as China, Japan, Vietnam, Laos, India, Singapore, the Philippines,
and Mongolia.
The legal systems of these countries allegedly lack a separation between law and religion
or traditional "transcendental" philosophies. They are characterized by an increased role for
mediators and "wise men," a high rate of survival of diversified local customs, emphasis on
duties rather than rights, and a hurried, though largely unsuccessful, attempt to transplant
Western legal codes and relationships. In my view, Mattei greatly overstates the importance of
traditional elements in the contemporary system while failing to appreciate the many signifi-
cant changes in the system. Indeed, few elements of the traditional legal system even survived
the intervening Mao period and the implementation of a socialist legal system.
To characterize China in terms of traditional law is therefore highly anachronistic. On the
other hand, China does share many features of a rule of political law system. Mattei acknowl-
edges that China's legal system exhibits many of the elements of a rule of political law, but he
apparently feels compelled to force China into the Oriental box along with such radically
different countries as India, Japan, and Morocco. Part of the problem is that China seems to be
moving toward some form of rule of law, but not the liberal democratic form of rule of law
that Mattei implicitly uses as his benchmark for a professional law system. (Mattei allows that
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Liberal Democratic rule of law, then I fully agree that any of the three
alternatives discussed herein, and possibly others as well, are likely to be
more useful for understanding the future path of development in China
(though all are still rule of law theories). Although Clarke claims that the
main problem with the IRI approach, "is that its practitioners tend to
leave unstated and unjustified its ,most crucial component: the ideal
against which the Chinese, legal system is identified and measured,"
Clarke himself never defines: in any detail what he means by "the West-
ern rule of law ideal."' 5° As we have seen, rule of law is a contested
concept, even in the West. In thinking about the role of law in China and
the possible path of future development, it is necessary to distinguish
between thin and thick theories and between different types of thick
theories. By so doing, predictions about rule of law in China beconfe
more open-ended and less teleological (although obviously the standards
of a thin theory, while allowing some diversity in institutions and prac-
tices, are teleological in nature).
C. Why We Can't Simply Abandon Rule of Law Talk or
Reserve Rule of Law for Liberal Democracies
In light of the many different interpretations of rule of law, might it
not be best simply to abandon reference to rule of law altogether?
Wouldn't it be more useful to adopt, for instance, a "microanalysis
approach"?'5 ' Microanalysis tries to avoid or at least minimize generaliza-
tions, metaphors, and conceptualizations as explanatory mechanisms.
Rather, microanalysts attempt to describe the way actions of independ-
ently motivated individuals create social systems by tracing the way
individual actions aggregate to produce larger social structures and insti-
tutions.
While there is considerable merit in the suggestion that what matters
most is not the label but the substance of particular legal reforms in
"Western-style rule of law" would be an acceptable alternative name for rule of professional
law).
Some of the traits found in China are hard to reconcile with such a system: a hierarchical
society, an emphasis on family, different gender roles, dissimilar conceptions of rights (or at
least a different balance between the interests of the individual and of the group), and different
justifications and rationales for those outcomes. One could add to this list: a different balance
in the role of law as strengthening or limiting the State, different conceptions of and limits to
civil society, a different balance between freedom and order or stability, and so on. These
features, however, are not at odds with rule of law per se, just with one particular version. Ugo
Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's Legal Systems, 45 AM. J.
COMP. L. 5 (1997).
150. Clarke, supra note 108, at 53.
151. See Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 711 (2001) (ar-
guing for the need to move beyond the rhetoric of democracy to focus on how institutions
actually work in the United States).
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China, abandoning reference to rule of law is neither possible nor desir-
able. As a practical matter, people both in China and abroad will
continue to invoke rule of law. Given that fact, it is better to try to bring
some clarity to the different uses of the term, by distinguishing between
rule by law and rule of law and between thin and thick conceptions of
rule of law and different types of thick conceptions, than to insist futilely
that the term be avoided altogether.
Moreover, legal reformers have pragmatic reasons for referring to
rule of law in that the normative appeal of rule of law may be used to
support controversial legal and political reforms. Indeed, one of the rea-
sons PRC scholars prefer thick conceptions to thin conceptions is that
thick conceptions allow them to discuss topics that would otherwise be
too sensitive to approach directly. For instance, bringing democracy and
human rights under the umbrella of rule of law may open up discussion
of sensitive topics such as multiparty elections, separation of powers,'5 2
and freedom of thought.'53
In addition, rule of law provides a useful heuristic guide for legal re-
forms in that the elements of a thin (or even thick) theory may be used to
clarify and prioritize areas in need of reform, and to see the relationships
between the various elements. It provides some structure to what other-
wise could be a chaotic, piecemeal reform process.
Assuming that we cannot abandon rule of law talk altogether, per-
haps we could limit rule of law to only the Liberal Democratic version.
After all, given that "rule of law" has become associated with Liberal
Democratic rule of law, one might argue that the term should not be
stretched to include other variants. When talking about China, one
should simply forgo use of rule of law in favor of other terms.
Although one is free to reserve the label "rule of law" for a particu-
lar version, forcing PRC ideas about rule of law into our prevailing yet
contingent categories smacks of cultural imperialism.
Second, the debate about legal reform in China has been couched in
terms of rule of law, both in China and abroad. Again, one could protest
every time the term rule of law is used or at least point out that the term
is being misused. Given that "rule of law" is a contested concept even in
the West, however, any attempt to appropriate the term for a particular
usage will be futile; the debate will continue to be posed in terms of rule
152. See, e.g., Li, supra note 13, at 8; Xie Pengcheng, Lun Dangdai Zhongguo de Fali
Quanwei [On the Authority of Law in Contemporary China], 6 ZHONGGUO FAXUE 3 (1995)
(suggesting that rule of law requires judicial independence, which demands some degree of
separation of powers, which, in turn, requires a change in the balance of power between State
and society and the development of civil society).
153. Hu Weixi, Sixiang Ziyou yu Minzhu Zhengzhi [Freedom of Thought and Democratic
Politics], in POLITICAL CHINA, supra note 15, at 120-23.
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of law, both by those inside and outside of China. Rather than restricting
the use of the term with respect to China, it is more useful to try to figure
out what those who use the term mean by it and why they want to invoke
it. How one defines rule of law will depend on what one's purpose is.
Investors, governments, multilateral agencies, NGOs, moral philoso-
phers, and political scientists all have different purposes for invoking
rule of law, and may therefore find some ways of defining or measuring
it more suitable to their particular purpose than others. That does not
mean that they are free to define rule of law as they like. Enough people
in the relevant discourse community must accept the usage for the
speech act to be meaningful, or for the definition to serve a useful pur-
pose. There is, however, enough common ground to the various
conceptions of rule of law, provided by the basic requirements of a thin
rule of law, to render the invocation of rule of law in the Chinese context
intelligible and useful.
Third, as just noted, many reformers in China want the debate
couched in terms of rule of law for strategic reasons: rule of law entails,
at minimum, some restraints on government leaders and opens up other
possibilities for political reform.
Fourth, simply relying on either Liberal Democratic rule of law ver-
sus rule by law is no longer sufficient to capture what is happening in
China. It is descriptively incorrect-the legal system is no longer a pure
rule by law. Nor can we capture all of the nuances in the PRC debates
about rule of law if we only have the overly simplistic categories of rule
of law (i.e. our Liberal Democratic version) or else rule by law.'54 With-
out more refined categories, we simply will not be able to understand
what is happening, either in terms of the evolution of PRC discourse or,
in practice, with respect to the development of the legal system.
Fifth, the practical import of forcing PRC discourse and practice into
our preconceived boxes of Liberal Democratic rule of law or authoritar-
ian rule by law is that we are likely to come to the wrong conclusions
about reforms. We are likely to be either too pessimistic or too optimis-
tic-either there is no fundamental change, or China is becoming "like
us" in some modem Western liberal democracies. Neither seems to be
the case. Misreading what is happening is likely to lead to bad policy
choices. Foreign governments and aid agencies could miss opportunities
to support reforms that would improve the PRC system, for example, by
failing to provide adequate resources for certain reforms because they do
154. Nor is it possible to simply rely on Jayasuriya's statist rule of law as an alternative.
The statist version fails to capture the differences between the Statist Socialist and Neo-
Authoritarian versions, and is at odds in significant respects with the Communitarian variant.
See LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA, supra note 5.
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not believe such changes could possibly work in a rule by law system
meant to serve the interests of the Party and nothing more. Alternatively,
time and resources could be wasted on projects that are not consistent
with the form of rule of law likely to emerge in China. Some rules or
practices that work in the context of a Liberal Democratic rule of law
might require liberal institutions and perhaps liberal values to succeed.
They may fail to take hold in a different legal order, exacerbating the gap
between law and practice.
Finally, objecting to the application of rule of law to China and other
States that are not liberal democracies overstates the differences and fails
to capture the considerable agreement with respect to the basic elements
of a thin rule of law. Despite considerable variation, all four variants of
rule of law accept the basic benchmark that law must impose meaningful
limits on the ruler, and all are compatible with a thin conception of rule
of law. As legal reforms have progressed in China, the legal system has
predictably converged in many respects with the legal systems of well-
developed countries, and it is likely to continue to converge in the future.
At the same time, however, there will inevitably be some variations in
rule of law regimes even with respect to the basic requirements of a thin
conception due to the context in which they are embedded. Hence signs
of both divergence and convergence are to be expected. Whether one
finds convergence or divergence depends to a large extent on the particu-
lar indicators that one chooses, the time frame, and the degree of
abstraction or focus. The closer one looks, the more likely one is to find
divergence. That is a natural result of narrowing the focus. Distinguish-
ing between thin and thick theories and between different thick theories
helps identify the similarities and areas of convergence while acknowl-
edging and explaining the differences.
D. From Theory to Practice: Are Non-Liberal Democratic
Rule of Law Systems Sustainable?
A frequent objection is that while it is possible conceptually to dis-
tinguish between these different types of rule of law legal systems, in
reality rule of law is only sustainable in countries that adopt Liberal De-
mocratic institutions and values. Yet Singapore and Hong Kong, among
others, are examples of non-democratic, non-liberal countries that have
enjoyed rule of law; "5 and contemporary Japan, Taiwan, and South
155. See BELL, supra note 8; Pan, supra note 34. Minxin Pei cites as further examples in
addition to Hong Kong and Singapore, Kaiser Germany, pre-1945 Japan, Pinochet's Chile,
Franco's Spain, and "nearly all Western European countries before they became democratic."
Minxin Pei, Legal Reform and Secure Commercial Transactions: Evidence from China, in THE
VALUE OF LAW IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 31 (Peter Murrell ed., 2001). To be sure, full im-
plementation of rule of law generally goes hand in hand with democracy. For instance, it was
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Korea seem to be examples of a Communitarian rule of law. While an
adequate discussion of whether or not these categories do in fact apply to
these countries and if so whether they are the best way to characterize
the legal systems would take us far afield, a few further comments may
help clarify some of the main issues.
Critics might argue that the use of the legal system to harass opposi-
tion politicians demonstrates that Singapore does not merit the label of
rule of law, and calls into question whether a non-democratic rule of law
is in fact possible. Of course, all systems fall short of the ideal of rule of
law, and Singapore is no exception. At times judiciaries reach decisions
that reflect a degree of politicization that is hard to reconcile with rule of
law. Many would argue that the U.S. Supreme Court's recent interven-
tion in the Gore-Bush election controversy in Florida was one such
instance.'56 However, the nature of executive interference with the judici-
ary in Singapore arguably constitutes a difference in kind, rather than
simply degree, and therefore Singapore does not merit the honorific
"rule of law" at all. Others, emphasizing all of the ways in which the
Singapore legal system does meet rule of law standards, may conclude
that such shortcomings simply demonstrate that Singapore's legal system
falls short of the ideal and yet on the whole may still be characterized as
a rule of law, albeit an imperfect one. For those in the latter camp, Sin-
gapore will be an example of a sustainable non-liberal democratic rule of
law. For the former group, Singapore will be further proof of the limited
ability of law to control State actors in a non-liberal democratic State.
Even if Singapore were not a good example of a non-democratic,
non-liberal rule of law, Hong Kong would qppear to be so. Granted,
Hong Kong may be a special case, having had the benefit, as it were, of
colonial rule by the British. Nevertheless, while many commentators
predicted that Hong Kong's reversion to PRC control would result in the
demise of rule of law, most now agree that Hong Kong has continued to
enjoy rule of law even after the handover.'57 There have undeniably been
only after Taiwan and South Korea democratized that the judiciary acquired enough independ-
ence and authority to handle virtually all politically sensitive cases in an impartial manner
according to law. Nevertheless, rule of law and impartial treatment in politically sensitive
cases do not necessarily require democracy, as evidenced by Hong Kong. Pei argues that the
key to autocracies maintaining rule of law is the existence of political constraints that oblige
rulers to exercise political moderation. These restraints may come from an independent aris-
tocracy, the church, a rising urban capitalist class, or external threats. Id.
156. Akhil Amar, Supreme Court: Should We Trust Judges?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2001,
at Mi.
157. For an even-handed, detailed account of important cases and legal developments in
Hong Kong since the handover, see Albert Chen, Hong Kong's Legal System in the New Constitu-
tional Order, in IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE's REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Chen Jianfu et
al. eds., 2001); see also The Joseph R. Crowley Program, One Country, Two Legal Systems?, 23
FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 1 (1999); Bureau of E. Asian & Pac. Affairs, United States Report on Hong
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bumps in the road, attributable in part to the differences between Hong
Kong's common law system and the more civil law system of the PRC as
well as the sheer complexity of operating a legal system based on the
historically unprecedented principle of one country, two systems. More-
over, some of the developments since reversion reflect the more
conservative policies of the new administration (though it bears noting
that Hong Kong was hardly a bastion of liberal democracy under the co-
lonial rule of the British). Yet the judiciary remains independent. Beijing
has been reluctant to intervene, doing so only when forced to by the ar-
guably rash actions of the Court of Final Appeals and Chief Executive
Tung Chee-hwa in the infamous illegal immigration case. '
Hong Kong differs from the mainland in many ways. Skeptics could
still claim that, as a general rule, establishing and maintaining rule of
law requires democracy.59 Indeed, China would seem to be an unlikely
candidate to implement and sustain rule of law without democracy given
the limits of socialist ideology and the Party's commitment to single
party socialism and maintaining its grip on power. Ultimately, the key to
the future realization of rule of law in China is power. How is power to
be controlled and allocated in a single party socialist State? To the extent
that law is to limit the Party, how does the legal system obtain sufficient
authority to control a party that has been above the law? In a democracy,
the final check on government power is the ability of the people to throw
the government out and elect a new one. In the absence of multiparty
democracy, an authoritarian government must either voluntarily relin-
quish some of its power or else have it taken away by force. Naturally,
Party leaders will resist giving up power so readily. They may therefore
be disinclined to support reforms that would strengthen rule of law but
also allow institutions to become so powerful that they could then pro-
vide the basis for challenging Party rule. The result may be that, at least
Kong (Aug. 7, 2001), at http://www.usconsulate.org.hk/ushk/pi/20010731.htm (last visited June
27, 2002). The Crowley report, which clearly assumes a liberal democratic orientation, was
more critical of Hong Kong with respect to democracy than with respect to rule of law.
158. See Chen, supra note 157. The actions of Elsie Leung, Secretary of Justice, in han-
dling the Sally Aw case are arguably even more objectionable from a rule of law perspective
than the way the illegal immigration cases were handled. In the Sally Aw case, Leung decided
not to prosecute Aw, the head of a newspaper and a friend of Tung Chee-hwa. When asked to
explain her decision not to prosecute, she at first limited her comments to general policy con-
siderations, refusing to go into detail as the case was still pending regarding other parties. In
response to a public uproar, she then sought to clarify her position and justify her decision in
part by appealing to public interest. Aw was in negotiations to sell her newspaper, and Leung
did not want to influence the sale. This broad interpretation of public interest provoked a hail-
storm of criticism, leading to a no-confidence vote, which Leung survived.
159. The absence of any example of a non-democratic rule of law State would not prove
that such a State is not possible or that the PRC could not become one, though it certainly
would give pause to those who believe it possible.
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on those issues that threaten the survivability of the Party, the needs of
the Party will continue to trump rule of law for some time-though of
course most of the issues confronting legal actors on a daily basis do not
threaten the Party.
I have argued elsewhere that there are reasons to believe that the is-
sue of power can be resolved in favor of rule of law and that law will
come to impose meaningful restraints on Party and government lead-
ers. "6 Briefly put, the development of the legal system hinges on more
than the ideas of the top leadership. Legal reforms will continue to be
driven to a considerable extent by objective forces, including the needs
of a market economy; the demands of foreign investors and domestic
businesses; the Chinese citizenry's desire for justice; international pres-
sure, as evidenced in the amendment of the Criminal Law and Criminal
Procedure Law, and China's accession to various human rights treaties;.6
GATT requirements, now that China has become a member of the WTO;
and the ruling regime's desire for legitimacy, both at home and abroad.
All of these forces, taken collectively, are likely to exert a much stronger
force on the pace and trajectory of legal reforms than the wishes of some
senior leaders who may be lukewarm about implementation of rule of
law.
CONCLUSION
Twenty years ago, few predicted that China's legal system would de-
velop to this degree. Given the remarkable progress, skeptics who deny
any fundamental change in the basic nature of China's legal system seem
unduly pessimistic or cynical. On the other hand, liberals who think
China is on the way to establishing a liberal legal system of the kind
found in Western democracies seem at once overly optimistic and under-
appreciative of differences in fundamental values that have led many
Asian countries to resist the influence of liberalism in favor of their own
brand of "Asian Values" (differences which remain even after we dis-
count the self-interested claims of leaders of authoritarian governments).
I suggest a middle ground. While the footprint of the system's in-
strumental rule by law heritage remains visible, there is considerable
evidence of a shift from a legal regime best characterized as rule by law,
toward a system that complies with the basic elements of a thin rule of
law. Even assuming-as appears to be the case-that China is moving
160. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 37.
161. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note .102 (describing the influence of
international pressure and international legal norms in the Criminal Procedure Law amend-
ment process).
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toward rule of law, which form is most appropriate for China remains
hotly contested. There is little evidence of a shift toward a Liberal De-
mocratic rule of law. China is not likely to embrace democracy in the
near future, for a variety of reasons.' 62 In the long run, however, China
may need to allow genuine democratic elections to enhance accountabil-
ity and to provide a peaceful mechanism for alleviating growing social
divisions. Even if China becomes democratic, it will not necessarily be-
come a liberal democracy or adopt a Liberal Democratic form of rule of
law.
162. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 37, ch. XI; Larry Diamond & Raymond Myers, In-
troduction: Elections and Democracy in Greater China, 162 CHINA Q. 365 (2000).
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TABLE I: A COMPARISON OF THE FOUR IDEAL
RULE OF LAW 'YPES PLUS RULE BY LAW
Liberal Democratic Rule of Law
Economic Regime * Free market
" Minimum government interference and regulation
* Clear distinction between public and private
_ Administrative discretion limited
e Democratic elections at all levels
• Neutral State
• Limited State
- Civil society as independent of State
• Liberal
* Emphasis on civil and political
* Deontological view of rights as antimajoritarian trump on social
good
a Freedom privileged over order
* Autonomy over social solidarity and harmony
• Freedom of thought and right to think over need for common
ground and right thinking on important social issues
* More attention to rights than character building, virtues, and duties
* Limited government
* Prevent government arbitrariness
* Protect individual rights
, Predictability and certainty: economic growth, allow individuals to
plan affairs
* Dispute resolution, protect property rights largely through formal
legal system
* Government efficiency and rationality
* Legitimacy
Institutions/ o High degree of separation between law and politics
Practices e Independent and elected legislature
o Autonomous and independent judiciary, with life tenure for judges,
appointment and removal relatively non-politicized
o Administrative law: mechanisms for reining in discretion, capable of
holding even top leaders accountable; public participation;
public can hold government officials accountable by throwing
government out of office
o Independent legal profession
Rules • Protection of civil and political rights; no registration requirements
for social groups; strong rights to protect accused in criminal cases
Political Regime
Purposes of Rule
of Law
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Chinese Communitarian Rule of Law
Economic Regime
Political Regime
" Market economy
" Managed capitalism
" More government intervention
• Public-private division not as clear
" More administrative discretion
" Democratic, multiparty elections
" Reject neutral State
" Larger role for State
* Civil society, but limits; groups free to go own way subject to
general limits, although some groups, particularly commercial
associations, may still establish corporatist or clientelist relations
with government, but soft or societal form of corporatism
Rights • Communitarian
- Emphasis on indivisibility of rights, collective rights
* Economic growth at expense of rights (liberty tradeoff)
, Utilitarian or pragmatic conception of rights
* Stability and order privileged over freedom
- Social solidarity and harmony as important if not more so than
autonomy
- Freedom of thought and right to think limited by need for common
ground and consensus on important social issues
* Attention to character building, virtues, and duties as well as rights
Purposes of Rule * Balance between law as means of strengthening State
of Law and limiting State
* Stability
* Prevent government arbitrariness
* Protect individual rights
* Predictability and certainty: economic growth, allow individuals to
plan affairs
* Government efficiency and rationality
* Dispute resolution, property rights protected through formal
and informal mechanisms, more reliance on corporatist and
clientelist ties
* Legitimacy
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Chinese Communitarian Rule of Law
Rules * Broad laws to protect State: State Secrets; endangering State
interests
, Illiberal laws: limit civil society, freedom of expression; registration of
social groups; or privilege group-no exclusion of tainted evidence
Neo-Authoritarian Rule of Law
Economic Regime @ Market economy
# Managed capitalism
* More government intervention
• Public-private division not as clear
• More administrative discretion
Political Regime * Single party rule, no elections or only at low level or appearance of
genuine elections but limits on opposition party
" Reject neutral State
" Even larger role for State
* Civil society, but limits, perhaps corporatist or clientelist relations
with government
* Moderate to high degree of separation between law and politics
P Independent and elected legislature
* Autonomous and independent judiciary, with life tenure for judges,
appointment and removal relatively non-politicized; arguably likely
to decide cases based on substantive agenda
* Administrative law: mechanisms for reining in discretion, capable of
holding even top leaders accountable; but more deference to
agencies in policymaking, emphasis on efficient government
balanced to some extent by need to protect individual rights;
opportunities for public participation in rule making and
interpretation; public can hold accountable by throwing out of office
* Independent legal profession, though perhaps monitored by State
agency such as Ministry of Justice (MOJ)
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Neo-Authoritarian Rule of Law
Rights * "Asian Values" or communitarian
* Emphasis on indivisibility of rights, collective rights
* Economic growth at expense of rights (liberty tradeoff)
- Utilitarian or pragmatic conception of rights
* Stability and order privileged over freedom
e Social solidarity and harmony over autonomy
- Freedom of thought and right to think limited by need for common
ground and consensus on important social issues; limits on right
to criticize government
e Attention to character building, virtues, and duties as well as rights
Purposes of Rule • Balance between law as means of strengthening State and limiting
of Law State favors strengthening
- Emphasis on stability;
* Predictability and certainty: mainly for economic growth, less to
allow individuals to plan affairs
* Government efficiency and rationality
- Dispute resolution, property rights protected through formal
and informal mechanisms, more reliance on corporatist
and clientelist ties
9 Legitimacy
* Limits: Government must act in accordance with law; law to prevent
government arbitrariness
* Protect individual rights, but not priority and limited
Institutions/ • Moderate separation between law and politics.
Practices • Legislature not elected
9 Judicial Independence may or may not be limited
e Administrative law system, capable of checking government
officials, professional civil service; more emphasis on rational
government than protecting individuals; more deference to
government in policymaking; opportunities for public participation
and monitoring
* Legal profession supervised by MOJ
Rules # Broad laws to protect State and social order: State secrets law;
endangering State interests
* Illiberal laws: limit civil society, freedom of expression: registration of
social groups; or privilege group-no exclusion of tainted evidence
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Statist Socialism Rule of Law
Economic Regime • Market economy
* Much government regulation
- Public ownership
Political Regime • Single party rule, no elections or only at lowest levels
- Reject neutral State
* Much larger role for State
* No or very limited civil society, high level of corporatist or clientelist
relations with government, hard or Statist form of corporatism
Rights • Emphasis on subsistence, economic growth at expense
of rights (liberty tradeoff)
* State sovereignty
* Utilitarian or pragmatic conception of rights
* Rights as grant from State
* Stability and order privileged over freedom
- Social solidarity and harmony over autonomy
* State prefers unity of thought to freedom of thought, right thinking
to right to think; tendency to exercise strict thought control if
possible; at minimum, strict limits against attacks on ruling party;
emphasis on thought work to ensure common ground and
consensus on important social issues
* Attention to character building, virtues, and duties as well as rights
Purposes of Rule * Emphasis on strengthening State
of Law e Stability
* Predictability and certainty: economic growth
* Law as way of enhancing government efficiency
and rationality
* Dispute resolution, property rights protected through formal
and informal mechanisms, more reliance on corporatist
and clientelist ties
- Legitimacy
- Some limits on State: government must act in accordance with law,
but accept limits begrudgingly; prevent government arbitrariness;
protect individual rights, but not priority and limited view of rights
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Statist Socialism Rule of Law
Rules e Broad laws to protect State: State secrets; endangering State
interests
* Illiberal laws: limit civil society, freedom of expression: registration of
social groups; or privilege group-no exclusion of tainted evidence;
administrative penalties such as reeducation through labor
Rule By Law
Economic Regime * Could be planned economy, free market, or managed capitalism
* Government intervention high
e Public-private distinction non-existent or unimportant
- Control by administrative policy and fiat
Political Regime • Single party rule, no elections
• Reject neutral State
" Totalitarian or authoritarian State
" No or very limited civil society, State-dominated corporatist
arrangements
* Moderate to low separation between law and politics
P Legislature not elected; Party influence on law-making process
* Functional independence of judiciary; no interference by other
branches; courts as independent as opposed to judges, so
adjudicative supervision; arguably likely to decide cases based on
substantive normative principles defined by State; regime wants
courts to serve Party interests
* Legal profession: subject to political requirements, partial
independence, mainly due to corporatist nature of relationship
with MOJ
* Administrative law: more discretion; more responsive to Party
policy; system imposes weak limits on top leaders, limited public
participation in rule making, interpretation and implementation;
limited ability for media and public to monitor
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Rule By Law
Rights • Emphasis on subsistence, economic growth at expense of rights
(liberty tradeofl)
* Socialist conception of rights as bourgeois; emphasis on duties,
particularly duties to State
a Rights as grant of State
9 Rights exist as programmatic goals only, no real protection of rights
* State sovereignty
* Social solidarity and harmony over autonomy
* State enforces strict thought control; unity of thought over freedom
of thought
- Strict limits against attacks on ruling party
Purposes of Rule • Law is tool to serve interests of the State; Party's role not defined in
of Law law; no meaningful legal limits on rulers
* Law enhances government efficiency
e Law not meant to protect individual rights
e Dispute resolution, but many disputes settled administratively or by
Party leaders rather than in courts
e Heavy reliance of mediation to resolve disputes "among the
people," formal legal system used to suppress enemies
- Party members not subject to courts
Institutions/ * No minimal separation between law and politics
Practices * Party policies supplant and trump laws
* Legislature not elected, just rubber stamp
- Courts not independent; Party determines outcome of specific
cases; adjudicative committee used to enforce Party line; courts
serve Party interests
9 Legal profession: lawyers as workers of the State; no
independence; work in State firms; limited rights to defend accused
* Administrative law: main purpose is government efficiency; officials
wide discretion, govern by fiat; no administrative laws provide
individuals right to challenge government; no or extremely limited
public participation in administrative process
Rules * Law relatively unimportant; much of day-to-day governance
by policies
o Absence of many major laws-criminal law, contract law, civil
procedure law
* Laws frequenly ignored in practice
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